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TIME-SHIFTED RATIONALITY AND THE LAW OF




People behave rationally. Except, apparently, when they don't. They
get emotional, comply with costly social norms, and offer puzzlingly poor
performances on any number of seemingly simple analytic tasks. This is,
increasingly, a problem for both economists and legal thinkers.
It is increasingly a problem because the evidence of intriguingly pat-
terned human irrationality has achieved critical mass and continues to grow.
It is a problem for economists because the standard economic model as-
sumes that humans will respond rationally to changes in incentives. And it
is a problem for legal policymakers because they so often rely on economic
analysis when recommending ways that incentives should be changed to
achieve the goals of law with the tools of law. Where the economics is
wrong, the law may be too.
As a result of the increasingly frequent mismatch between the popular
theory of human behavior and the human behavior that is popular, a number
of influential legal scholars have recently published articles arguing that
something ought be done, and suggesting precisely what.' Generally, these
* Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law; Professor of Law, Arizona State Univer-
sity College of Law; Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology; Research
Fellow, Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research; BA, Amherst College; J.D., Yale Law School.
Ideas developed here were presented at The Olin Conference on Evolution and Legal Theory at
Georgetown University Law Center, April 16, 1999; the annual meeting ofthe Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (SEAL), September 1999; and the Colloquium on Law, Behavioral Biology, and Eco-
nomics at Arizona State University College of Law, November 17, 2000. The author is grateful to par-
ticipants in these fora for many useful observations. John Alcock, Anupan Chander, Helena Cronin,
Robert Ellickson, Ira Ellman, Adam Gifford, Oliver Goodenough, Lydia Jones, Dennis Kadjala, Russell
Korobkin, John McGinnis, Erin O'Hara, Richard Posner, Jeffrey Rachlinski, John Robertson, Paul
Rubin, Jeffrey Stake, Lynn Stout, Andy Thomson, Thomas Ulen, Amy Wax, Larry Winer, Paul Zak, and
Todd Zywicki also provided particularly helpful comments on preliminary versions. E. Donald Elliott,
Robert Frank, and Jack Hirshleifer suggested a number of useful sources. Sonia Krainz, Eva Shine, and
Charles Oldham offered able research assistance, and Arizona State University College of Law provid.d
generous scholarship support.
I See, eg., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
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works of "behavioral law and economics" (here "BLE") reflect a new inter-
disciplinary approach that would incorporate into legal analysis important
findings about irrationality from the field of cognitive psychology (and its
cognates variously known as behavioral economics and behavioral decision
theory).2 Expanding on Herbert Simon's notion of "bounded rationality, '
and work conducted and popularized by Tversky, Kahneman, and Thaler on
the cognitive "heuristics and biases" that may flow therefrom,4 BLE schol-
arship identifies and explores possible implications for law of consistent
and patterned deviations from rational choice predictions.
This bounded rationality approach, while promising, faces two hurdles.
The first is methodological. Commentators argue that BLE is undertheo-
rized. That is, it reasons from observations to implications without explana-
tions. As explored further below, this criticism has some merit. The
second hurdle, partly a consequence of the first, is practical. Many econo-
mists, as well as law and economics scholars, remain skeptical of behav-
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract De-
fault Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behav-
ioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
(2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); Thomas S.
Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (1998).
Recent symposia on the legal implications of irrational behavior have appeared in 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998) and 51 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (1998). Note 40, infra, provides a more extensive sampling of
the dozens of articles on this subject that have recently appeared.
2 This outpouring of scholarship appears under various names. These include "behavioral law and
economics," "law and behavioral science," "behavioral analysis of law," "behavioral economic analy-
sis of law," "the behavioral approach to law and economics," "behavioral economics analysis," and "law
and the 'new' psychology." See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1; Sunstein, supra note 1; Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future oflBehav-
ioral Economic Analysis ofLaw, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 (1998); Jolls et al., supra note 1; Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998)
[hereinafter Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychol-
ogy: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000). For rea-
sons that will become clear below, I prefer the title "law and behavioral science," though it is not yet in
broad use.
For an historical perspective on the rise of behavioral economics, see Colin Camerer, Behavioral
Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics, 96 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 10575 (1999); David
Laibson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the Ascent of Behavioral Economics, 16 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1998); Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, Behavioral Economics, working paper
entry in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7948 (Oct. 2000).
3 Simon introduced the concept of bounded rationality in Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). Subpart I.A, infra, briefly traces its influence.
4 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST
BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 67 (Robin Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds., 1987). "Heuristics"
is the term describing the supposed rules of thumb by which people commit these cognitive errors, and
"biases" are the errors themselves, when systematic across a study population. See John Conlisk, Why
Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 670 (1996).
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ioral economic findings and claims, and are evidently loathe to relax the
traditional rationality assumption.5 For them, existing data on alleged irra-
tionalities are-without more-unpersuasive and insufficient to warrant
complicating existing models that so often work well. In either case, any
successful integration into law of behavioral economics insights depends on
both developing its theoretical foundation and demonstrating that behav-
ioral law and economics can be merged with existing law and economics
analysis without either visiting undue violence on cherished assumptions of
proven value or sacrificing inconvenient facts on the alter of pet theories.
As we attempt to develop a theoretical foundation that can adequately
encompass both rational and irrational behavior, in a model useful for law,
it is worth remembering that all theories of behavior are ultimately theories
about the human brain. As any concerted study of biology makes clear, this
seemingly banal observation is in fact far from trivial. For our actions in-
evitably reflect the brain's information processing patterns, which in turn
reflect its form and function. And we now know that the form and function
of the human brain, like the form and function of all other organs of the
body, have been significantly influenced by powerful, omnipresent, evolu-
tionary processes, including natural and sexual selection, whose important
roles in influencing human behavior remain underappreciated. Since care-
ful study of these evolutionary processes has long been the province of the
field of behavioral biology, and since a great deal is now known about the
influence of evolutionary processes on species-typical brain function, it
seems not only probable but inevitable that behavioral biology can offer
something constructive to the interdisciplinary effort to understand and pre-
dict human irrationality in ways useful to law.6
In prior work, I have argued that the extraordinary grovth of behav-
ioral biology renders obsolete any law-relevant model of human behavior
that fails to integrate life science perspectives with social science ones, and
that this deficiency can be remedied, in part, through what I have referred to
as evolutionary analysis in law.7 Here I argue that advances in behavioral
5 For a useful examination of why economists are so attached to their assumptions about human ra-
tionality, see Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and te Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L & SoM.
INQUIRY 487,487-91 (1994).
6 The term behavioral biology is susceptible of several meanings. By its use I mean to refer to the
study of biological influences on behavior, as presently advanced by scholars in numerous fields, includ-
ing but not limited to evolutionary biology, behavioral ecology, ethology, evolutionary psychology, pri-
matology, and evolutionary anthropology. The cross-disciplinary nature of the subject matter defies
easy efforts to name it. But a principal, shared, and core idea is simply this: evolutionary pross
(such as natural selection and sexual selection)-together with environmental and physical inputs-built
brains equipped with information-processing predispositions that consequently yield nonrandom bh av-
iors.
7 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child
Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Lav; Oevcn D. Jones,
Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior. 8 J. CONTFIP. L. IssuES 167
(1997); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevcntion, 87
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biology have largely overtaken existing notions of bounded rationality, re-
vealing them to be misleadingly imprecise-and rooted in outdated assump-
tions that are not only demonstrably wrong, but also wrong in ways that
have material implications for subsequent legal conclusions. This can be
remedied. Specifically, behavioral biology offers three things of immediate
use.
First, the measured deployment of easily accessible principles of be-
havioral biology can lay a foundation for both revising bounded rationality
and fashioning a solid theoretical basis for understanding and predicting
many human irrationalities. Behavioral biology can not only help to expose
precisely what critics suspect is missing from the existing approaches to ir-
rationality-it can also help to supply it.
Second, a principle we may derive from the fundamentals of behav-
ioral biology, which I term time-shifted rationality (or "TSR"), can help us
CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape); Owen D. Jones,
Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, 53 U. FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter
Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History].
The general idea that legal thinkers should take account of the influence of human biological heri-
tage on human behavior relevant to law has been raised on numerous occasions, in a variety of contexts.
And such work provides important background for all that I attempt here. See, for example, various
programs of both the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, http://www.gruterinstitute.org,
and the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), http://www.sealsite.org. See RICHARD
ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1979) (containing chapter on "Evolution, Law, and
Justice"); JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON
THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989) (discussing advantages
and limits of using evolutionary theory in legal thinking); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON (1992); Amicus Brief of the Gruter Institute, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); King-
sley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and
the Gender Gap, 37 AZ. L. J. 972 (1995); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41
ST. LOUIS L. J. 595 (1997); Robin Fox, In the Matter of "Baby M"- Report from the Gruter Institute for
Law and Behavioral Research, 7 POL. & LIFE SCI. 77 (1988); Lawrence Frolik, THE BIOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF THE UNDUE INFLUENCE DOCTRINE: WHAT'S LOVE GOT TO Do WITH IT?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
841 (1996); Oliver Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Ap-
proach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. REV. 263 (1998); Mark Grady & Michael McGuire, A
Theory of the Origin of Natural Law, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 87 (1997); Cheryl Hanna, Can A Bio-
logical Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Women?, 22 VT. L. REV. 333 (1998); John 0.
McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996); Wil-
liam Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Takings in Natural Resources
Law, 10 ECOLOGY L. Q. 205 (1982); Paul Rubin & Chris Paul, An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk,
17 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 585 (1979); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand
Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705 (1990); Margo Wilson, Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family
Law, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 217, 223 (1987); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mis-
took His Wife for a Chattel, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
GENERATION OF CULTURE 289, 310-13 (Barkow et al. eds., 1992); "Ethology of Law: Biological Bases
of Legal Behavior" (seminar offered at Yale Law School by E. Donald Elliott and Roger Masters in
1988); numerous other sources cited in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law An Introduction
and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1121-23 n.3 (1997), as well as in an on-line bib-
liography I maintain at the "Readings" page of the SEAL website at http://www.sealsite.org.
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to usefully disentangle phenomena currently lumped together under the la-
bel bounded rationality. Doing so suggests that some seeming irrationali-
ties are not, in fact, the product of conventional bounded rationality, as that
concept is generally understood, but are instead the product of a very differ-
ent phenomenon. As a consequence and by-product of this analysis, it is
possible to reconcile some of the supposed irrationalities with an existing
rationality framework in a new, more satisfying, and more useful way.
Third, behavioral biology affords the raw material for deriving a new
principle, which I term the law of law's leverage, that can help us to better
understand and predict the effects of law on human behavior.8 Specifically,
it can help us anticipate the comparative sensitivities of various human be-
haviors to legal changes in incentives. That is (to put it more explicitly in
economic terms) it enables us to anticipate differences in the slopes of de-
mand curves for various law-relevant behaviors. 9 This law of law's lever-
age can therefore afford us new, coherent, and systematic power in
predicting the comparative costs to society of attempting to change behav-
iors through legal means. And the principle also provides a new and pow-
erful tool for explaining and predicting many of the existing and future
architectures of legal systems.
Each step in this argument bears its own Part. The first step is pre-
ceded, however, by some additional context, immediately below, to frame
the issues more fully and to highlight precisely what is at stake. The last
step is followed by discussion of several possible objections to this line of
reasoning.
I. CONTEXT
This Part provides brief overviews of bounded rationality, the issues at
stake in behavioral law and economics, and critical reactions to behavioral
law and economics scholarship.
A. Rationality, Irrationality, Bounded Rationality
As is commonly known, economists modeling choice under conditions
of scarcity assume that people are rational maximizers.3 0 Though defini-
tions of rationality vary, for present purposes we can consider rational be-
8 See Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology; Moraliy and the Disruption of Ordcr, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2100-01 (2000) (conjecturing on the possibility of deriving this relationship from
the principles ofbehavioral biology).
9 Even more technically, I am referring to differences in the elasticities. See infra note 140.
10 See generally DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS O% LW AND
ECoNOmiCS (1992); HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAW.YERS (1998); ROBERT COoTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONO IC A ,.NALYStS OF
LAW (5th ed. 1998).
I1 For useful distinctions between different kinds of rationality, see ROBERT !1. FR,%NK,
MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1997); Korobkin & Wlen, supra note I.
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havior to come in two kinds. Behavior is substantively rational when it is
appropriate to the achievement of given goals, within the limits imposed by
given conditions and constraints. Behavior is procedurally rational when it
is the outcome of appropriate deliberation.
12
Dividing labor, economists tend to focus on the former kind of ration-
ality, while psychologists tend to focus on the latter.13 That is, economists
assume that individuals pursue consistent ends using efficient means, re-
gardless of whether their choices reflect conscious deliberation and calcula-
tion) 4  Of course, that assumption reflects a simplification, rather than a
belief. (As, in similar fashion, we might assume for purposes of analyzing
forces in a collision that each car is a sphere-without actually believing it
to be so.) Yet despite that unrealistic simplification (and in many ways be-
cause of it) this general economic approach to rationality has proved fa-
mously useful.' 5
Rationality, of course, has a carefully prescribed meaning that does not necessarily imply conscious
deliberation. Richard Posner notes, for example, that rational behavior is not limited to humans.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 85 (1992).
12 See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, I MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982) [hereinafter SIMON, 1 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY]; Herbert
Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in METHOD AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 424
(S.J. Latss ed., 1976) [hereinafter Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality].
13 As Herbert Simon puts it:
The rational person of neoclassical economics always reaches the decision that is objectively, or
substantively, best in terms of the given utility function. The rational person ofcognitive psychol-
ogy goes about making his or her decisions in a way that is procedurally reasonable in the light of
the available knowledge and means of computation.
Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209 (1986).
14 Individuals are assumed to make choices that will "pursue consistent ends using efficient means
[as a function of] preferences which are complete, reflexive, transitive, and continuous." NICHOLAS
MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNERTO POST-MODERNISM 57
(1997); see also Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A
Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 67 (Robin Paul
Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).
15 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); POSNER,
supra note 10.
Ofcourse, we need not necessarily care whether the behavioral model law employs is perfectly accu-
rate or complete. Newtonian physics fails to describe accurately the interaction of particles at the quan-
tum level, and yet it nonetheless serves quite well when launching rockets. The pragmatic test,
therefore, for whether the often serviceable rational actor model should continue to serve, is simply
whether it accomplishes the tasks we assign it more efficiently than would a model that squarely ad-
dressed irrationality-when both the benefits and costs of changing from or supplementing the existing
neoclassical model are taken into account. Sacrificing accuracy for simplicity can be rational when the
marginal increase in accuracy is outweighed by the increased costs of learning and using a more com-
plex model. See Gregory S. Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to Expand Its Curriculum?, 22 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 149, 154 (1997) (making similar point); see also Douglas G. Baird, Introduction to Sy/n.
posium: The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward, 64 U. CI. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1997)
("The use of assumptions in economics is perhaps the aspect of the field that lawyers understand the
least. Economists aim to capture as much of the dynamics of behavior as they can with the fewest pos-
sible assumptions. The question is not whether economists' assumptions are unrealistic, but whether
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Even setting aside, as inapposite, those critiques of economic ap-
proaches that reflect definitional and methodological misunderstandings of
the economic approach to behavior, it remains clear that the history of eco-
nomics includes a history of criticism. 16 Moreover, the rapidly accumulat-
ing evidence that people quite frequently behave irrationally-and do so in
consistent, widespread, and patterned ways-has afforded some rational
choice critics present and tangible momentum.' 7 Several typical contexts,
which are widely considered to represent significant challenges to the edi-
fice of traditional economic theory, have garnered much attention and will
briefly illustrate several of the basic phenomena upon which BLE scholars
build.' 8
they capture enough of what is at work to allow us to see basic forces operating in an otherise impene-
trable maze.").
The possible benefits of a more accurate but more complicated model will approach materiality as a
function, in part, of the number of different contexts in which people behave irrationally, the legal sig-
nificance of those contexts, the proportion of the population that so behaves, the costs of their doing so,
and the marginal increase in predictive power that a modified behavioral model would afford. The costs
of a more accurate model will obviously depend, in part, on how accessible its theoretical foundations
are, how easily we can apply it to legal concepts, and with what results.
16 For a critique of allegedly conservative ideological bias, see RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST
BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (Robin Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds., 1987); Amartya K.
Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Thcory, in PItILOSOPIY
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 87 (Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis eds., 1979). For concern that traditional law
and economics analysis underestimates the influence of social norms, see ERIC A. POSNEr, LAW Ar.D
SOCIAL NoRis (2000); Richard H. MeAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms. 96
MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).
17 See, eg., THALER, supra note 4, at xxi (In some well-defined situations, people make decisions
that are systematically and substantively different from those predicted by the standard economic
model.').
Technically, the point that humans are not always rational is neither new nor surprising. Se, eg.,
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L REv. 451
(1974). But only in recent years has the evidence of and interest in substantively irrat'onal behavior
reached unignorable proportions. This is underscored by the admissions, in microcconomie textbooks,
that "even with transparently simple problems, people often violate the most fundamental axioms of ra-
tional choice.' FRANK, supra note 11, at 247. For a useful overview, see id. at 245-0
IS For useful introductions to behavioral economics and cognitive psychology rele,,ant to human ir-
rationality, see HAL APtERS & KENNETH HAMMOND, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAxING: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (1986); JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS, BIASES IN HuMAN REASONING:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (1989); ROBIN HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DECISION (2d ed. 1987); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES A.ND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); MASSIMO PIAT'ELU-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE
ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR MINDS (1994); RATIONAUTY: PSYCHOLOGICAU. AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (K.1. Manktelaw & D.E. Over eds., 1993); SCOTT rLOUS, TIlE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993); THALER, supra note 4; RICHArD TILAIEU.
THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992); THE LLtrTs OF
RATIONALITY (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990); Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Post-
tive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); Ulen, supra note 5. Sec also
sources cited in Conlisk, supra note 4, at 670.
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Real people have inconsistent preferences. For example, they will
place a high value on losing weight, but eat ice cream. 19 They cooperate
too much. For example, they leave a tip in a restaurant far from home, that
they will never visit again, for a waiter they will never again see, for service
already and irrevocably rendered. 20  They miscalculate calendars and
clocks, over-weighting the present compared to the future. For example,
they often prefer to receive $100 today than $110 in a week but, in odd re-
verse, opt for $110 in eleven weeks over $100 in ten weeks. 2' They employ
absurdly high discount rates. For example, they regularly prefer a slightly
less expensive but energy-guzzling appliance to a slightly more expensive
appliance that is far less costly to run.
People routinely give answers that are highly sensitive to logically ir-
relevant changes in questions. Research suggests, for example, that people
will strongly prefer to support a hypothetical policy in which sixty percent
of the people in a population live to one in which forty percent of them
die.23 They display seemingly irrational tastes for both fairness and spite,
often preferring to forgo receiving a benefit in order to impose a cost on
someone they consider to be unfair.2 4 And, perhaps most famously, among
19 For discussion of such self-control problems, see Richard ff. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Eco-
nomic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 (1981).
20 For discussion, see Ulen, supra note 5, at 491.
21 Camerer, supra note 2, at 10576; see also George Ainslie, Derivation of "Rational" Economic
Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount Curves, 81 INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 334 (1991); George Loewen-
stein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 QJ,
ECON. 573, 574-75 (1992); George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal
Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181 (Fall 1989); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later,
89 AM. ECON. REv. 103, 103 (1999) ("When considering trade-offs between two future moments, pre-
sent-biased preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer."); Ulen, su-
pra note 1, at 1758.
22 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 211 (1995); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST, April 1984, at 341. As Thomas Ulen notes:
[Pleople routinely ignore the warnings of dermatologists that overexposure to the sun can cause
skin cancer later in life but may pay attention if the dermatologist tells them that the sun may cause
large pores or blackheads in the near future. Most homeowners do not have nearly enough insula-
tion in their attics and walls, even though the cost of installing more would lead to significant sav-
ings on energy use within one year....
... [D]iscount rates decline sharply with the length of time that the subject must wait for her
reward and with the size of the reward. These experimental results are not consistent with re-
ceived economic theory, which holds that discount rates should equal the market rate of interest
and that the discount rates should be constant (i.e., invariant to the period of time considered) and
certainly invariant with respect to the amount of money involved.
Ulen, supra note 5, at 513-14.
23 An early article on such "framing" effects is Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986).
24 For an overview, see Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1186. The phenomenon is often studied in so-
called "ultimatum games." The ultimatum game is straightforward: "A is given an amount of money.
He can offer as little or as much ofit as he pleases to B. IfB accepts the offer, A gets to keep the rest; if
B refuses, neither gets anything." Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
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the many other oddities, 25 people value something they have just received at
a higher amount than they would have been willing to pay for it.26 For ex-
ample, people often demand a far larger sum to sell an object they have just
come to own than they would be willing to pay to acquire that object from
someone else, even when the transaction costs of acquisition are very low.
27
In each of these cases, considered in sequence in subpart III.B. below,
people behave in ways not predicted by standard economic assumptions.
For instance (taking up the last example) standard economic assumptions
imply that, after controlling for wealth effects, differences between an indi-
vidual's maximum willingness to pay for a good and the minimum compen-
sation demanded for the same good should be negligible. Yet they are
not.
28
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1564 n. 27 (1998). As discussed in section III.B.5, infra, B refuses the
offer far more often than traditional analysis predicts.
25 Scratching more of this expansive surface of human irrationality, John Conlisk has noted that
people also, among other things, make false inferences about causality, ignore relevant information, ex-
aggerate the importance of vivid over pallid evidence, exaggerate the importance of fallible predictoro,
display overconfidence in judgment relative to evidence, exaggerate confirming over disconfirming evi-
dence relative to initial beliefs, do redundant and ambiguous tests to confirm an hypothesis at the ex-
pense of decisive tests to disconfirm, display intransitivity, and make frequent errors in deductive
reasoning tasks such as syllogisms. In addition, they misunderstand statistical independence, mistake
random data for pattern data and vice versa, fail to appreciate the law of large number effects, fail to
recognize statistical dominance, make errors in updating probabilities on the basis of new information,
understate the significance of given sample sizes, fail to understand covariation, and exaggerate the cx
ante probability ofa random event that has already occurred. Conlisk, supra note 4, at 670.
26 For overviews, see Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indif-
ference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, i7llingness to Pay
and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpcecte DTspariy, in Measures of
Value, 99 QJ. ECON. 507 (1984); George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in Predicting Tastes, 105
ECON. J. 929 (1995).
27 See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay s. Willingness to Accept: Le-
gal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993) (reviewing literature on endowment effect
and discussing alternative explanations); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect.
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion
and Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIvES 331,
339 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Arlen, supra note 2, at 1771-72.
The conundrum has been explained this way:
One should value a coffee mug at S5, whether one owns it or not: certainly, there should not be a
large gap between what one would pay to acquire it and the price at which one would sell it. So
much for standard microeconomic theory: the well documented endowment effect refers to the fact
that people indeed must be paid more to give up a good than they would pay to get the very same
good in the first instance. The effect has been tested in a variety of thought and actual experi-
ments, where it has been robustly found that people insist on being paid about twice as much for a
good as they would pay to acquire it: about S 10, for a mug that they could readily buy for S5.
Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81
VA. L. REV. 1341, 1352 (1995).
28 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 93
J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). It should be noted, however, that the magnitudes of this endowment effect
sometimes vary. See Robert Franciosi et al., Experimental Tests ofthe Endowment Efct, 30 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 213 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Pscholo3., of
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Over the years, economists have proposed various ways of reconciling
these supposed irrationalities with rational choice theory. As one example,
apparent inconsistencies in the ordering of preferences can result either
from multiple "selves," each with different tastes, or from preferences that
simply lacked sufficiently precise articulation to make the supposed incon-
sistency disappear.29 For another example, seemingly over-cooperative be-
havior can result from individual effort to maximize "psychic income"
(provided we assume that being altruistic brings happiness). Although, to
be fair, such explanations are not quite as glib as they at first sound, neither
are they particularly satisfying.
Over time, the concept of "bounded rationality" has emerged as one of
the most popular ways to explain seemingly irrational behavior without
straying too far from traditional economic assumptions. 30  Although its
meaning has varied, 3' bounded rationality draws attention to the discrep-
ancy between the perfect human rationality that economic theory often as-
sumes and actual human behavior as it is observed in economic life.
Bounded rationality essentially captures the idea that there are very real,
very important constraints on the actual human capacity to gather and proc-
ess information.
32
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998).
29 As Ulen notes, "whenever there are seeming deviations from the predictions of price theory,
economists can usually explain those deviations without having to assume that the decision makers in-
volved are irrational." Ulen, supra note 5, at 489. Ulen explains that even when there seems to be a real
anomaly, it is considered insufficient to have falsified rational choice theory. Economists may invent
"effects," that by labeling the phenomenon appear to reconcile it with rational choice assumptions, or
simply posit that there are important "nonmonetary elements in their utility functions." Id. at 490, 498.
30 Important works in bounded rationality include Simon, supra note 3; Simon, From Substantive to
Procedural Rationality, supra note 12; Sen, supra note 16; and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); JOHN ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE
SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1998);
Conlisk, supra note 4; Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 47 (1998); John El-
ster, When Rationality Fails, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 19 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret
Levi eds., 1990); Barton L. Lipman, Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey,
CANADIAN J. ECON., Feb. 1995, at 42 (and sources cited therein); Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Hu-
man Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior].
31 As one commentator observes:
Despite the fact that many economists view bounded rationality as a more realistic and more ap-
propriate assumption than perfect rationality at least for many situations, there are very few papers
that explore the implications of bounded rationality. The reason for this is very simple: there is no
clear agreement on how one models this phenomenon.
Lipman, supra note 30, at 43; see also Avery W. Katz, Introduction to Chapter 7, in FOUNDATIONS OF
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 267, at 267-68 (Avery W. Katz ed., 1998) (noting same); Gregory
Lilly, Bounded Rationality: A Simon-like Explication, 18 J. ECON. DYNAMICS IN CONTROL 205 (1994)
(noting same). One commentator goes so far as to say that there has been a steady "subsumption, exten-
sion, elaboration, and transformation" of Simon's bounded rationality. James G. March, Bounded Ra-
tionality, Ambiguity, and Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 147 (John Elster ed., 1986).
32 Useful overviews appear in Conlisk, supra note 4; Lipman, supra note 30; Herbert A. Simon,
Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION (1972) [hereinafter Simon, Theories
of Bounded Rationality]; see also HERBERT A. SIMON ET AL., ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY
1150
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1150 2000-2001
Tine-Shited Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage
Some constraints-such as how much information the finite brain can
hold, and how quickly it can calculate-are internal. Other constraints-
such as the amount of time and energy required to gather all relevant infor-
mation, and to process it-are external. Together, these constraints limit
human information-gathering and information-processing capacities in
ways that can yield deviations from perfectly rational, optimal outcomes.
That is, the notion of bounded rationality enables us to conclude that what
we observe as substantive irrationality-the failure to choose the optimal
outcome under the circumstances-may often be the product of procedural
rationality operating within realistic constraints. Positing bounded rational-
ity thus temporarily alleviates the irrationality problem, because the high
costs of acquiring complete information and the fixed limits on human
computation, viewed together, make it clear that in some cases, paradoxi-
cally, it would be irrational to become fully informed.3
For example, it can be procedurally rational to spend less time on a
problem than an optimal solution would require, once a minimally accept-
able solution becomes apparent. The practical impossibility of calculating
the best of all possible moves in chess is often cited as an illustration.3
People are "satisficers," in Simon's terms,35 rather than "optimizers," be-
cause the constraints of bounded rationality require them to rely upon hab-
its, educated guesses, and rules of thumb that tend to yield satisfactory-if
not necessarily optimal--outcomes.
36
AND THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION (1992) [hereinafter SIION, TIlE COGNITMVE RE'OLUTION]; SION, I
MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 12; HERBERT A. SIMON, 2 MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL EcONOM ICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (1982); HERBERT A. SiMON. 3
MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED EcoNoMIc REASON (1997);
WILLAmSON, supra note 30; Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, supra note 30; Hebert A. Simon,
Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: TlE CONTLAsT BETWEEN
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 25 (Robin Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds.. 1987).
In Simon's view:
"[B]ounded rationality" is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive
limitations of the decision maker-limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity.
Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral approach to economics, which is deeply
concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences the decisions that
are reached.
Herbert Simon, Bounded Rationality, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONO..tICS 266,
266 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter Simon, BoundedRationality].
33 See FRANK, supra note I1, at 247.
34 See, eg., SIMON, THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION, supra note 32, at 29; Simon, Theories of
Bounded Rationality, supra note 32.
35 On the early history of the concepts of satisficing, see Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Ra-
tlional Choice, 69 QJ. ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Ent!-
ronment, 63 PSYCHOL REV. 129 (1956); Herbert Simon, Theories of Dccision-Ma!dng In Economics
and Behavioral Sciences, 49 AM1. ECON. REV. 77 (1957). On Simon's later formation of the concept,
see Herbert Simon, A New Theory of Satisficing, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 35 (1990).
36 A useful discussion appears in Katz, supra note 31, at 267-68. Katz distinguishes bounded ra-
tionality from the traditional notion of constrained maximization this way: "Under the model of bounded
rationality, uncertainty and imperfect information are modeled not as constraints within which rational
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B. The Issues at Stake
The bounded rationality explanation for substantively irrational behav-
ior is central to behavioral law and economics scholarship. 37 For by con-
straining rational choice theory with actual choicefacts, behavioral law and
economics scholars hope to inject more realism into behavioral models, to
improve the ability to predict human behavioral choices, and to pursue the
legal implications of this. 38 (After all, notes Sunstein, "the legal system is
pervasively in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and
contexts for choice. '39)
At stake in this pragmatic effort are no less than some of the most cher-
ished notions of law and economics.40 Behavioral anomalies are quite trou-
individuals maximize, but as limits on the reasoning process itself." Id.
There is some recent movement to recharacterize the process of "satisficing" as the deployment of
"fast and frugal heuristics." See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer et al., How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuris-
tics?, in DECISION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WARD
EDWARDS (James Shanteau et al. eds., 1999).
37 Simon, defining "behavioral economics," notes:
Behavioral economics is concerned with the empirical validity of these neoclassical assumptions
about human behavior and, where they prove invalid, with discovering the empirical laws that de-
scribe behaviour correctly and as accurately as possible. As a second item on its agenda, behav-
ioral economics is concerned with drawing out the implications, for the operation of the economic
system and its institutions and for public policy, of departures of actual behavior from the neoclas-
sical assumptions. A third item on its agenda is to supply empirical evidence about the shape and
content of the utility function (or of whatever construct will replace it in an empirically valid be-
havioral theory) so as to strengthen the predictions that can be made about human economic be-
havior.
Herbert Simon, Behavioral Economics, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 221,
221 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
In comparison, Simon also notes:
"[B]ounded rationality" is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive
limitations of the decision maker-limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity.
Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral approach to economics, which is deeply
concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences the decisions that
are reached."
Simon, Bounded Rationality, supra note 32, at 291.
38 See, e.g., Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis, supra note 2.
39 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS I (Cass R. Sunstein ed,,
2000).
40 A sampling of only comparatively recent BLE scholarship includes dozens of sources. See, e.g.,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory
Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality
and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339
(1998); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response
to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Ky-
sar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420
(1999); Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of
Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral
Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis
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bling for legal thinkers, Ulen has explained, for if we premise legal policy
on the assumption that people behave rationally, and if their behavior too
systematically proves otherwise, then the desired results of our legal rules
may not follow. 41 If individuals make many more errors in their attempts to
maximize their utility or profit than the rational choice model assumes, and
those errors are due not to the standard sorts of market imperfections but
of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Christine Jolts ct al., Theories and
Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (1998); Jolts et al., supra note 1; Kim
A. Karnin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Does Not Equal Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight,
19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part ofa Rhetorical Duct:
A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998); Mark Kelman ct al., Context-
Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996); Russell Korobkin, The Effi-
ciency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationali. and
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L REV. 1583
(1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationaliy
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Russell Korobkin, Policymaking
and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L REV.
663 (1994); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Ex-
perimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1994); Alan Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Bhav-
ioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, I
Am. L. & ECON. REv. 276 (1999); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychologn Economics, and Set-
tlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997); Russell Korobkin, 7e
Status Quo Bias and Contract's Default Rules, 83 CORNtLL L. REV. 608 (1998); Timur Kuran & Cass
R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature
Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998) (containing useful bibliography of other behavioral law and
economics scholarship); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope. Selling Risk Some Lessons for La, from
Behavioral Economies About Stockbrokers and Sophisticatcd Customers, 84 CAL. L REV. 627 (1996);
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994); Edwrd J. McCaffery
et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L REV. 1341
(1995); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L REV.
1551 (1998); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 113 (1996); Jeffrey .
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L REV. 61 (2000);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics and Cautious Sup-
porters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remcdties
and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral
Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law, and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L REV.
1679 (1998); Stake, supra note 27; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Lawv, 64 U. C|II. L REV.
1175 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, I A.1. L & ECON.
REv. 115 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHiL & PUB. AFF. 3 (199 1); Thomas S.
Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law. 12 HAMLINt L. REV. 385 (1989);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L REV. 1747
(1998); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Victims-Rational Injurers: Cognition and the Economic Analysis of
Tort Law, in LAw AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 387 (Robin Paul Malloy &
Christopher IC Braun eds., 1995); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Polic," Psychological Evi-
dence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991); Arlen, supra note 2; Jennifer Arlen ct al.,
Endowment Effects. Other-Regarding Preferences and Corporate Law, Olin Working Paper No. 00-2
USC Law School (April 21, 2000) (manuscript on file with author).
41 Ulen, supra note 5, at 492.
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rather to a widespread repertoire of cognitive imperfections, and those er-
rors are systematic (rather than randomly distributed with mean zero), then
our analysis of the efficiency properties of legal rules is in error to the ex-
tent that it ignores these cognitive imperfections.42
Even a partial list of contexts in which BLE scholars have recently at-
tempted to incorporate (rather than ignore) cognitive imperfections gives a
clear sense of potentially sweeping implications. These contexts include
contracts, torts, property, criminal law, bankruptcy, health care, social secu-
rity, risk regulation, tax, and corporate securities, as well as topics ranging
from judging to market manipulation.4 3 Four concrete examples-derived
from property law, general litigation, environmental law, and criminal
law-will illustrate the breadth and significance of what behavioral law and
economics proponents believe to be at stake.
Consider property rights. As is well-known, the venerable Coase
Theorem predicts that, so long as transaction costs are low, the initial distri-
bution of entitlements (through either property rights or liability rules) is ir-
relevant to the final allocation of resources.44 The market will correct
distributional inefficiencies by moving resources to those who value them
most highly. Nevertheless, numerous experiments, argued to have revealed
a pervasive "endowment effect," suggest that the initial allocation-
whatever it may be-will be vested (or "endowed") with certain psycho-
logical inertia. This will affect the final allocation, irrespective of transac-
tion costs.
As mentioned earlier, standard economic theory predicts that (after
correcting for wealth effects) the value a person ascribes to an object should
be completely independent of its ownership, reflecting a stable constancy of
preferences. But it is not.45 Cognitive psychology research suggests that
failure of the Coase Theorem to predict reality is not just attributable to the
high costs of information and negotiation. Rather, people tend to value an
object more highly as soon as they possess it-often twice as highly-
compared to how they value the same object if they had to purchase it.46
Put another way, their indifference curves shift in a systematic manner as
soon as they acquire a good, increasing the ascribed value of the endowed
good relative to all other goods.47
If this is true, then end distributions of entitlements are quite sensitive
to initial distributions of entitlements, quite independent of information
42 Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINS L.
REv. 385, 388 (1989).
43 See generally sources cited supra note 40.
44 A useful discussion appears in Stake, supra note 27, at 346-47.
45 See generally Kahneman et a., supra note 28; McCaffery et al., supra note 27; Rachlinski &
Jourden, supra note 28.
46 Loewenstein & Adler, supra note 26, at 929.
47 Id. at 929-30 (noting that the endowment effect can be viewed as a type of endogenous taste change).
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costs and transaction costs. The initial allocation of entitlements matters, it
seems-much more than we used to think.48 As Ulen puts it, the fact that
content and strengths of preferences seem predictably to vary as a function
of the initial distribution of property or rights is troubling "because it sug-
gests that it may be impossible to discuss the assignment of rights meaning-
fully in terms of efficiency."49 It is difficult to divide up property or wealth,
so as to maximize things, when the things being maximized shift in the
wind.
Consider litigation. Traditional economic theory predicts that people
will pursue litigation so long as the potential recovery, discounted by the
probability of success, exceeds foreseeable litigation costs. 50 This sounds
reasonable, because we expect people not to spend a dollar to buy a ten per-
cent chance of winning two dollars. Nevertheless, experimental evidence
from "ultimatum" games reveals a rather widespread, though seemingly ir-
rational, taste for spite.5 1 Participants regularly choose to forgo a small gain
in order to impose a larger loss on someone they consider to have unfairly
overreached. That is, they sometimes pay happily just to see someone else
pay more. One legal implication of this is that we can expect that, at least
when a sense of having been treated unfairly is at issue, real world litigants
may continue to litigate longer than expected, indeed long after they have
concluded that the monetary costs will exceed likely monetary gains.
Consider environmental regulation. Rational choice theorists predict
that people will purchase a slightly more expensive, less polluting item, if
the difference in cost between that item and a less expensive but more pol-
luting one can be recouped in, say, a year. In fact, people routinely do the
opposite, due apparently to irrational, hyperbolic discounting.5 2 Consider,
too, the effect of framing effects on choosing between logically equivalent,
environment-relevant alternatives.5 3  Experiments suggest that when con-
48 As Stake puts it: "Thus assets are sticky; after their initial allocation, they tend to stay pUL...
This psychological attachment to belongings should be added to transaction costs and wealth limitations
on our list of commonly occurring barriers to market correction." Stake, supra note 27, at 347.
49 Ulen, supra note 5, at 517.
50 See. eg., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 10, at 288 ('Rational individuals will not pursue even
meritorious legal claims if their expected recovery is less than the attorney's fees, costs, and other ex-
penses involved.").
St See, e.g., C.F. Camerer & R.H. Thaler, Ultimatums. Dictators, and Manners, 9 J. EcO:J. PESSP.
209 (1995); Weiner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECONZ. BmIAv.
& ORO. 367 (1982); NV. Guth & R. Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survoy in Comparison Ex-
perimental Results, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL 417 (1990). See also FRANK, supra note 11, at 237 (discuss.
ing ultimatum game); Sheryl Ball & Catherine C. Eckel, Economic Value of Status, 27 J. SoctO-
EcoNoMIcs 495,497 (1998) (discussing ultimatum game and citing much of the recent literature).
52 See generally Ainslie, supra note 21; Kris N. Kirby & RJ. Hermstein, Preference Reversals Due
to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reeward, 6 PSYctIOi S0. 83 (1995); Loewenstein & Prelec, supra
note 21.
53 Se4 eg., McCaffery et al., supra note 27; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUs. S251 (1986); Amos Tversk)y & Daniel Kahneman, The Fram-
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sumers are told that they can use energy conservation methods to save X
dollars per year they behave differently than if told that, if they do not use
energy conservation methods, they will lose the same amount each year.
5 4
Consider criminal law. Rational choice theory predicts that people will
evaluate the desirability of an option presented, in the jury context, inde-
pendent of variations in other options presented. Cognitive psychologists
have demonstrated a seemingly disproportionate influence of context on
choice: the same option can appear more or less attractive as a function of
how it is contextualized with other options.55 Preferences are termed "con-
text-dependent" if a choice between two options is affected by the presence
of a third option that provides no new information about the relative merits
of the other options. Context dependence includes both compromise effects
and contrast effects. The compromise effect is at work when the same op-
tion is evaluated more favorably when it is seen as intermediate in the set of
options under consideration than when it is extreme. The contrast effect is
evident when an option is evaluated more favorably in the presence of simi-
lar options clearly inferior to it than in the absence of such options. The
contrast effect suggests, for example, that merely including instructions on
"lesser included offenses" in criminal trial jury charges can powerfully af-
fect verdicts.56 This is patently inconsistent with our preferences for how
juries should reach decisions.
C. Reactions to BLE Scholarship
Despite the seemingly unassailable logic that faulty premises can lead
to faulty legal policies, reactions to BLE scholarship have been mixed.57 To
be fair, behavioral law and economics has several strengths that should be
(and often are) freely acknowledged. For example, BLE relies on large ac-
cumulations of empirical cognitive science. Proponents in both cognitive
science and law are, by and large, well-known scholars respected for their
creativity, insight, and intellectual rigor. There are also, as noted above,
important legal implications, if all the phenomena described are robust.
And the phenomena are inherently interesting, with intuitive resonance for
readers who can observe these supposed irrationalities, inconsistencies, and
emotional by-products blossoming daily in the rich, colorful, human world
around them.
Yet, even after making due allowance for the relative youth of behav-
ing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 30 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
54 This phenomenon is discussed in Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1177.
55 See generally Kelman et al., supra note 40, at 301.
56 Id.
57 See. e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The
Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and
the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L. REV. 537 (2001); Kelman, supra note 40; Posner, supra note
24; Ulen, supra note 1; Arlen, supra note 2.
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ioral law and economics, scholars evaluating both existing BLE work and
its prospects for the future are not unqualifiedly enthusiastic. For example,
some have argued that BLE proponents overstate the supposed passionless-
ness of Hoino econonicus.5 8 Some express concern that certain named psy-
chological effects seem to emerge, rather inexplicably, far more strongly in
some experiments than in others. 59 And at least several critics maintain that
some of the much-heralded cognitive effects on which behavioral law and
economics relies are misleading artifacts of experimental conditions, lead-
ing to incorrect conclusions.60
The most important and ultimately constructive criticism, however, is
that BLE simply lacks any theoretical foundation. 61 BLE scholars stand ac-
cused, for example, of merely organizing anecdotes, and of confusing coun-
terstories for theories. This should not, of course, be construed as
automatically damning. After all, unexpected empirical facts can, in suffi-
cient number, warrant changes in legal strategies for pursuing existing
goals, even absent convincing explanations for their patterned occurrence.
58 See, eg., Posner, supra note 24.
59 See, eg., Arlen, supra note 2.
60 See Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence: An Adaptation for Frequencies, in TIlE
EVOLTION OF MIND 9 (Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Colin Allen eds., 1998); sec also Leda Cosmides
& John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from
the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58 CONmON 1 (1996); Gerd Gigerenzer, Hot to atake
Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, in 2 EUROPEAN REVIEWI OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 83 OVolfgang Strobe & Miles Hewstone cds., 1991).
61 This was the principal point of contention in a colloquy involving Richard Posner and Mark Kcl-
man, on one hand, and Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler ("JST"), on the other, in a re-
cent issue of the Stanford Law Review.
For example, Kelman argued:
What is ultimately perhaps more bothersome about JST's piece is that they are so unself-critical
about the degree to which behavioral economics can better be seen as a series of particular coun-
terstories, formed largely in parasitic reaction to the unduly self-confident predictions of rational
choice theorists, than as an alternative general theory of human behavior. Again and again, the au-
thors seem to confuse discordant observations for a countertheory and evade questions about the
gaps in the behavioral picture, seemingly believing, quite wrongly in my view, that acknowledging
these gaps would fatally wound their enterprise.
Kelman, supra note 40, at 1586. Kelman then goes on to comment on the "manifest incompleteness as
theories" of behavioral law and economies offerings. Id. And he claims that much of the JST article
consists of organizing "anecdotes." Id. at 1580.
Richard Posner argued:
[BLE] is undertheorized because of its residual, and in consequence purely empirical, character.
Behavior economics is defined by its subject rather than by its method and its subject is merely the
set of phenomena that rational-choice models (or at least the simplest of them) do not explain....
Describing, specifying, and classifying the empirical failures of a theory is a valid and important
scholarly activity. But it is not an alternative theory.
Posner, supra note 24, at 1559-60.
Other commentators, though perhaps ultimately more optimistic than Kelman and Posner, also voice
strong reservations about the existing state of supposed theoretical underpinnings of BLE scholarship.
See. eg., Ulen, supra note 5, at 521 ("[W]e are a long way from having a coherent theory of these indi-
vidual imperfections in choice and the exercise ofjudgment."); Arlen, supra note 2.
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And a number of BLE scholars have succeeded in making convincing cases
for legal reform, based on empirical data about irrationalities alone, irre-
spective of causes.
Nevertheless, in the absence of buttressing theory such efforts repre-
sent isolated successes, rather than promisingly synergistic ones that would
signal a broad, systematic approach. For it is quite clear in the end that
BLE shows neither a present and satisfactory account of the origins and pat-
terns of identified irrationalities, nor signs of making quick progress toward
developing one. Constructing the theoretical foundation of these phenom-
ena will ultimately be necessary if BLE is to achieve its potential and be as
useful, persuasive, and important to law as its proponents now hope.
There are two reasons. First, a good theory is essential for the long-
term success of any otherwise fact-driven argument. For instance, a theory
that can make coherent sense of unusual, unfamiliar, or inconveniently ab-
errational data eases acceptance that the data are accurate and meaningful-
a typical prerequisite for supporting legal changes. Second, a good theory,
combined with good data, affords greater predictive power than data alone,
pointing the way toward useful but otherwise unnoticed facts. After all,
data neither self-collect nor self-organize. They are a function either of
stumbled-upon luck, or of presuppositions that, if wrong, may unintendedly
obscure otherwise useful law-relevant data.62
At present, both behavioral law and economics scholarship, and the
underlying cognitive psychology literature on which it relies, are simply far
better at explaining that people often behave in ways inconsistent with tra-
ditional economic theory than they are at explaining why they do so. 63 To
critics both friendly and less friendly, BLE is at base a movement founded
on scattered discovered anomalies that, no matter how robust, are as yet
wholly unconnected by theoretical foundation or adequate explanatory sup-
port. This impedes the persuasiveness of BLE, hinders its growth, and
highlights its predictive shortcomings. For without a theory of where these
anomalies come from, why they appear, and how they may be connected, it
is difficult to anticipate in whom they will appear, in what contexts, and
with what vigor.64 Conspicuously absent is a "meta-explanation" to weave
62 See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L,
REv. (forthcoming 2001).
63 Arlen notes, "Behavioral analysis of law does not have a coherent model of human behavior in
part because the existing behavioral scholarship has not focused on developing such a model. Behav-
ioral economists and cognitive psychologists generally have focused on demonstrating that people do
not necessarily exhibit rational choice." Arlen, supra note 2, at 1768 (emphasis added); see also
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 30, at 3-4 ("We have clear, causal, and experimental observations that indicate
systematic deviations from the rational man paradigm. We look for models that will capture this evi-
dence.").
64 Ulen observes that "[wie do not know, for example, whether these cognitive imperfections affect
all of us in the same sorts of situations.., or only an identifiable subset of individuals in limited circum-
stances ...." Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections in the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 14AMLINIS
L. REv. 385, 408 (1989). "We need to know if in some circumstances cognitive limitations affect all
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the various anomalies together into some larger pattern, and provide coher-
ence to the whole.
While some BLE scholars are content, for the time being, to base legal
analysis on empirical facts unexplained at the theoretical level, other BLE
scholars dispute the claim that BLE lacks theory.65 They offer two argu-
ments deemed separately sufficient, but quite dispositive when conjoined.
The first argument for why behavioral law and economics is not under-
theorized follows this syllogistic form. A theory generates accurate predic-
tions; BLE generates accurate predictions; therefore BLE has a theory.65
This cannot work. A theory, in the scientific sense, requires far more than
the ability to make accurate predictions. And an empirical regularity is not
a theory. For example, predicting that since rocks and leaves fall toward
the earth raindrops will too provides no theory of falling, even if raindrops
do in fact fall as predicted. In both the technical and lay senses, we know
that no number of accurate predictions can alone offer explanations. 67
The second, stronger, argument for why BLE is not undertheorized is
from counter-example. The status quo bias evident in endowment effects,
BLE scholars argue to illustrate, has been explained by "prospectthoy
(also appearing as "loss aversion" or "regret avoidanc"). 69  This argument
actors, and if in others they only affect certain people." Ulen, supra note 1, at 1757.
Arlen notes:
It is difficult to predict how, when, or whether many of these biases will manifest themselves in
the real world because scholars do not yet fully understand why many of them exist-they are em-
pirical results awaiting a full theoretical explanation. Yet we cannot be confident an observed bias
really does affect actual decisions-as opposed to being simply an artifact of experimental de-
sign--until we can explain why the bias exists. Even when we are confident a bias exists, we must
know why people exhibit the bias in order to determine when they will do so and also the extent to
which a particular bias may be susceptible to manipulation....
... [I]t will be difficult to construct a more realistic model of human behavior based on cogni-
tive biases whose origins, scope, and magnitude are not well understood.
Arlen, supra note 2, at 1768-69, 1778.
Posner claims, "it is profoundly unclear what 'behavioral man' would do in any given situation. He
is a compound of rational and nonrational capacities and impulses. He might do anything. [Leading
BLE scholars] have neither a causal account of behavioral man nor a model of his decisional structure."
Posner, supra note 24, at 1559.
65 See, eg., Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelmnan 50 STAN. L REV.
1593, 1597 (1998).
66 Id. at 1597-99.
67 For an argument that BLE scholars often confuse description for theory because they confuse
prediction for explanation, see Posner, supra note 24, at 1560.
68 For an explanation of prospect theory, see Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive 7hcory of Con-
sumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGAN. 39 (1980). Prospect theory was first proposed in Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETitRcA
263 (1979).
69 See, eg, Jolls et al., supra note 65, at 1597 (defending); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Manda-
tory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CiN. L. REV. 1023 (2000) (describing how "loss aver-
sion" and "regret avoidance" have been advanced as explanations for the "status quo bias").
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essentially consists of two separate claims: a) the reason that the lowest
price for which a person will sell an item often materially exceeds the high-
est price they would be willing to pay to buy the very same item is because
the prospect of losing something one has looms larger, psychologically,
than the prospect of failing to gain the same item;70 and b) this account pro-
vides sufficient theoretical substructure for understanding endowment ef-
fects.
This also cannot work. Explaining one phenomenon as the product of
another, closely related phenomenon is intuitively appealing, but never sat-
isfying, even when the phenomena are in fact causally linked. Arlen, Spit-
zer, and Talley, in a recent paper, explain one reason why this approach
fails to satisfy:
Attributing the [endowment] effect to loss aversion only begs the questions of
when loss aversion occurs, and what factors influence the magnitude of the ef-
fect. In other words, stating that a person 'endowed' with a good exhibits loss
aversion does not help us predict under what circumstances a person will 'en-
dow' a good.... [W]ithout a thorough explanation for the psychology of en-
dowment it is difficult to predict ex ante whether, and to what extent, the effect
will operate in any given circumstance.7'
Put somewhat differently by Edward McCaffery (a BLE proponent),
explaining endowment effects with prospect theory is like trying to explain
the phenomenon of rain by pointing out that it is caused by a storm.72
70 "The loss aversion proposition is that losses have greater subjective impact than objectively
commensurate gains." Stake, supra note 27, at 339; see also Edward J. McCaffery et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL
ECONOMICS 167, 169 (1991) (explaining that loss aversion is "the generalization that losses are
weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate gains in the evaluation of prospects and
trades"); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1353 (1995) ("Loss aversion refers to the phenomenon that gains are less
valued, in absolute terms, than losses are disvalued. The subjective utility of losing a good exceeds that
of gaining it, even controlling for wealth effects.").
71 Jennifer Arlen, Mathew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects, Other-Regarding Preferences
and Corporate Law, Olin Working Paper No. 00-2 USC Law School 20 (April 21, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). For example, "experimental evidence reveals that people do not in-
variably 'endow' all entitlements: 'endowment' depends on the nature of the commodity, the subject's
psychological sense of entitlement to it, and the legal rights protecting it." Id.; see also Rachlinski &
Jourden, supra note 28, at 1556-59.
72 Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory in Tax, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1866-67 (1994). Rus-
sell Korobkin, another leading BLE scholar, takes an intermediate view, finding "regret avoidance"
somewhat more satisfactory, as an explanation for endowment effects, than "loss aversion." Russell Ko-
robkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract's Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 657 (1998). He
notes: "The concept of loss aversion provides a convincing descriptive account of the status quo bias,
but it is neither completely satisfying nor helpful because it provides no motivational theory: why are
individuals often loss-averse?" Id. The same question might be posed of regret avoidance: why do in-
dividuals experience greater regret when undesirable consequences follow from action than from inac-
tion?
Any attempt to solve these problems with recourse to norms would only abstract the problem up one
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These are significant criticisms. Strictly speaking, however, they are
not entirely new. The debate over whether or not BLE can or does satisfac-
torily explain the puzzling behaviors of the human animal precisely dupli-
cates early debates in biology over what constitutes adequate explanations
for the often puzzling behaviors of other animals.
It is obvious that explanations require an understanding of causes. It
was less obvious, as biologists eventually clarified, that causes of behavior
in living organisms are categorically different than causes of, say, the me-
andering of rivers or allegedly tortious accidents. Investigating such causes
requires different methods. It is this unique nature of causation in the con-
text of behavioral phenomena that ultimately makes the well-established
methods of behavioral biology so useful for present purposes, in thinking
about puzzling human behaviors. Those methods help not only to clarify
what the debate between BLE scholars and critics is all about, but also to
show how that debate can be resolved in ways that open up new avenues of
research, with new prospects for legal relevance.
The next Part, which will substantiate the claims just made, provides a
(necessarily quite condensed) overview of behavioral biology.
i. BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY AND EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS
A. Proximate and Ultimate Causes
For most contexts in which inanimate phenomena are at issue, it makes
little difference whether we ask "how?" questions or "why?" questions in
seeking explanation. This is as true in law as it is in other contexts. For ex-
ample, note that the answer to the question "Why did the scale fall on Mrs.
Palsgraf?"--a question certainly relevant for determining if liability for in-
jury might attach, and to whom-elicits precisely the same legal inquiry
and answer as the question "How did the scale come to fall on Mrs.
Palsgraf?" As is well known from the famous Palsgraf opinion,'3 Judge
Cardozo recounts that an entire series of precursor events, each independ-
ently scrutable, led to an ignition ... which caused an explosion... which
caused a reverberation ... which caused a falling upon ... which caused
Mrs. Palsgraf s injury. Whether or not Cardozo was accurate in his descrip-
tion of the facts,' 4 the important point is that we in law, as illustrated by
Palsgraf, usually come to understand a phenomenon in its component parts
adequately for our purposes of assessing rights, duties, and appropriate li-
ability regardless of whether our inquiy is shaped by how or why ques-
tions. Those questions are-here and so often-functionally equivalent.
level. One would still have to explain why some norms, rather than others, are so much more likely than
random to arise independently in human populations all over the globe.
73 See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
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How explains why.
Not so with the behavior of living organisms. 75 A moment's reflection
on a simple analogy will clarify. Suppose one were to observe a male robin
singing in the spring, and were to wonder why he does so. There are two
very different kinds of causal analysis required to satisfactorily explain the
phenomenon. One kind of causal analysis attends to the physical pathways
by which singing occurs. From this perspective, the "cause" of singing is
the predicate sequence by which hormonal changes, triggered by the
lengthening of successive days, causes neural actions in the brain, that in
turn cause the lungs to pass air forcefully over appropriately shaped vocal
chords. Sound ensues.
But it is immediately apparent that this causal analysis-this partial
component of an explanation-leaves important questions unanswered. It
does not explain why it came to pass that lengthening days rather than
shortening ones spark the hormonal changes. Nor does it explain why the
hormonal changes lead to singing behavior rather than to, say, one legged
hopping up and down. Such answers-which can make sense of why be-
havioral phenomena are linked in specific ways to environmental phenom-
ena-are categorically beyond mechanistic methods, no matter how far
back we trace the chain of necessary, causal events.
Only a second kind of causal analysis, attending to the historical proc-
esses by which organisms come to exhibit particular traits and not others,
can provide the missing answers. From this perspective, the "cause" of
75 Space limitations obviously preclude summarizing behavioral biology in any detail. Moreover,
existing summaries in law reviews of basic and well-accepted principles are already available. See, e.g.,
Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 7, (Part I of which provides "A Primer in Law-Relevant
Evolutionary Biology."); see also Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and
Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 131 (1999); William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers,
and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993). For recent discussion of the relationship between
biology and the social sciences, see Todd J. Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and the Social
Sciences, 13 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1 (2000), available at http://www.humanestudiesreview.org/fall2000l
secondframeset.html.
Treatments of modem behavioral biology for the general audience include: TIMOTHY H.
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND
BEHAVIOR (1991); STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS (1997); MATr RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:
SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
Accessible textbooks, for gaining more technical familiarity with the issues here discussed include:
JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID BUSS,
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2000); MARTIN DALY & MARGO
WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); SCOTr FREEMAN & JON C. HERRON,
EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2001); DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2d ed.
1986); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (2001); JAMES L. GOULD & CAROL GRANT GOULD, SEXUAL SELECTION (1997); J.R. KREBS &
N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993); MARK RIDLEY,
EVOLUTION (1993); ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
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singing is the process by which remote ancestors of today's singing males
announced territory, advertised health and availability, attracted mates, and
left more offspring than did contemporaries not predisposed to sing, or pre-
disposed (for example) to sing and mate in the harsh winter, rather than the
spring. To the extent that the ability to sing and the urge to sing in response
to certain environmental cues were influenced by heritable predispositions,
the proportion of male robins in successive generations that sang inevitably
increased over time until the trait became typical of males of the species.
Behavioral biologists consequently understand that both kinds of
causes-mechanistic pathways and evolutionary processes-provide two
very different but equally necessary components of a full explanation of be-
havior. By biologists' convention, the former kinds of causes are termed
"proximate causes." The latter are termed "ultimate causes."
76
Proximate causes in biology (similar to, but definitely not to be con-
fused with, proximate causes in law) are essentially "how" causes or imme-
diate causes, relating to the internal mechanisms, physical processes, and
organismic development that are predicates to behavior. Ultimate causes
are more properly "why" causes, describing evolutionary processes by
which a behavior came to be commonly observable in a species, and help-
ing to explain the underlying reasons why given environmental stimuli
(lengthening and warming days rather than shortening and cooling ones)
tend to yield certain kinds of behaviors (such as singing) rather than certain
alternative or random behaviors (such as hopping). Proximate causes are
often defined in terms of physiology and biochemistry, for example, as well
as an organism's unique developmental/environmental life history. Ulti-
mate causes are often defined in terms of the history and reproductive con-
sequences of behavior.77
The significance of recognizing the distinction between the biological
terms of art proximate causation and ultimate causation cannot be over-
stated. Proximate and ultimate causes always operate together, with all be-
havior depending on ultimately shaped proximate mechanisms. Because
evolutionary processes operate as inexorably on brain function as they do
on the function of every other part of the body, proximate and ultimate
causes are an integral part of comprehensive explanations for law-relevant
76 The venerable proximatefultimate distinction traces to Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology,
134 SCIa'CE 1501 (1961), and Gordon H. Orians, Natural Selection and Ecological Thcor. 96 AM1.
NAT. 257 (1962). On proximate and ultimate causation, see generally ALcOC supra note 75, at 2-6;
GOLDSMITH, supra note 75, at 3-11,46-69; John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Utility ofthe Proximate-
Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 EnIOLOGY 58 (1994); Goldsmith & Jones, supra note 75; and
Jones, Sex, Culture. and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at 874-77.
77 Another example: "Why do polar bears have white furs? The proximate explanauon is that the
polar bears' body doesn't make pigment for the fur. The evolutionary explanation is that white polar
bears catch more seals than brown ones." InterLiew with Randy Nesse. 14 HUM. ETH0LOGY BULL,
Dec. 1999, at 3. Care should be taken not to confuse the term of art "ultimate," meaning "evolutionary,"
with its lay meaning of "superior"or "more important."
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behaviors.78
Obviously, ultimate causation analysis will be more useful in some
contexts than in others. In many cases, we may feel that our existing under-
standing of a phenomenon, even if that understanding extends only to
proximate causes, is sufficient for our purposes. But often, when we are
puzzled about human behavior, an inquiry into ultimate causation will
prove a useful complement to existing efforts to understand and predict the
behavior.
Such is the case with human irrationality. What is currently missing
from, and acutely needed by, efforts to find satisfactory explanations for
why the irrational behaviors arise is analysis of seemingly irrational behav-
iors from the level of ultimate causation. In many cases, ultimate causation
analysis can help to explain why such behaviors are so widespread, and
why they exist in the very specific patterns that they do, instead of in other
patterns, or in no patterns at all.
Because so many of the contexts we commonly encounter in law do
not require disentangling "how" questions from "why" questions, "how"
answers are often misadvanced as "why" answers. And current efforts to
explain human irrationalities (by the theory of loss aversion, for example)
are, while essential, nonetheless attending only to the proximate half of the
full causation equation. They are thus really providing "how" answers, not
"why" answers, and it is for this reason that those answers appear insuffi-
cient and undertheorized to critics.
The balance of this Article explores how accessible methods and find-
ings from behavioral biology can address the other half of the causation
equation, and how behavioral biology insights can be partnered with current
efforts in order to develop a more complete and useful explanation for hu-
man irrationalities.
B. From Brain to Behavior and Back
From the perspective of ultimate causation, nervous systems exist be-
cause they enable organisms to perceive important environmental informa-
tion (objects, other organisms, dangers, and the like), to process that
information (stimuli may, for instance, represent food, mates, threats, or
offspring), and to respond appropriately to the environment (thus: eat food,
copulate with mates, avoid threats, nourish offspring). Because only some
of the many possible reactions to different environmental stimuli lead to
continued existence and reproductive success (contrast: copulating with
food, fleeing potential mates, ignoring predators, and eating offspring),
nervous systems that more successfully bias the bodies that bear them to-
ward behaviors that tended to be reproductively advantageous in ancestral
78 For an introduction to studying law-relevant behaviors and legal processes from a perspective that
explicitly integrates proximate and ultimate causation, see Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra
note 7.
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environments tend to appear in larger and larger percentages of successive
populations.
Here is the basic logic. Behavior requires both perception and infor-
mation processing. Perception and information processing are thoroughly
dependent on brain function. Brain function reflects the evolutionary proc-
esses that built the brain's intricate functionality. Therefore, behavior-the
principal output of the brain-reflects evolutionary processes.
79
What are the implications? There are several of immediate use to un-
derstanding irrationality. As a result of what we know about the evolution-
ary processes of natural selection and sexual selection,60 operating over
evolutionary time,'81 we may have some confidence in the following conclu-
sions (widely-accepted in relevant scientific communities, and simplified
here for brevity).
First, the brain was not designed to maximize individual utility. Noth-
ing is. Individuals do not replicate, nor do brains. Only genes do."2 Evolu-
79 Again, detailed description of behavioral biology would be unwieldy and duplicative. An ex-
tended primer on the subject of this section appears in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note
7. A shorter overview appears in Goldsmith & Jones, supra note 75.
80 "Natural selection" is the inevitable result of any system that combines heredity, variation, and
differential reproduction. Those heritable traits (including, for example, behavior-biasing neural algo-
rithms) that tend to increase reproductive success more than do heritable traits contemporaneously borne
by others tend to appear in larger and larger proportions of subsequent generations. The compounding
effect is so dramatic that even a heritable trait providing its possessor with a mere 1,a reproductive ad-
vantage over its contemporaries will swell (all else being equal) from 1% representation in a population
to 99% in merely 265 generations. TRIVERS, supra note 75, at 28-29.
Technically, natural selection is one of four factors influencing gene frequencies. The other three
are: (1) mutation, involving replication errors in genetic codes; (2) gene flow, referring to migration of
genes between populations due to the movement of organisms carrying them; and (3) random drift,
which describes the effects of chance events, such as accident or disease, on reproductive success. See
GOLDSi rH, supra note 75, at 29-31.
"Sexual selection," occurring in all species in which males and females differ in their hypothetical
reproductive maxima and parental investment minima, drives differences in mate choice, which in some
circumstances can yield different heritable physical and behavioral features between the sexes. On natu-
ral and sexual selection, see generally ALCOCK, supra note 75; GoLDsm.IH, supra note 75; GoLw:,ms
& ZINIMERMAN, supra note 75; GOULD & GOULD, supra note 75; MAT RIDLEY, supra note 75; and
TRIVERS, supra note 75.
s Our primate ancestry alone (not even to mention our mammalian and pre-mammalian ancestry)
extends back fully 70 million years. This makes our primate history more than thirty-five thousand
times as long as the (trifling) two-millennium period we recently celebrated. Sea Jones, Evolutiona'
Analysis in Law, supra note 7, at 1129-32.
82 There is far more to this proposition than can be covered here. But the important point is that we
err if we believe that natural selection operates primarily at the level of the individual or of the group. It
has been demonstrated beyond peradventure that it does not. With extremely rare exceptions (not rele-
vant here) natural selection operates primarily at the level of the gene, since genes, not individuals or
groups, are replicating entities. In other words, every organism is a parliament of genes, and its mor-
phology and behavior are in an important sense epiphenomenal to the interaction of genes that were se-
lected to reproduce themselves by cooperating with one another. It follows, technically, that the brain
has been designed more to maximize the replication of an individual's constituent genes than to maxi-
mize an individual's interests, per se-notwithstanding the fact that this design generally leads to behav-
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tionary processes therefore favor replication of genetically heritable traits,
some of which appear (in frequencies discounted by degrees of consanguin-
ity) in relatives.8 To the extent that people and other animals often behave
as if they were rational maximizers of individual utility, it is partly because
their information processing pathways have been honed by natural selec-
tion, the most relentlessly economizing force in the history of life; and
partly because maximizing individual utility is often epiphenomenal to
maximizing genetic utility. As a result, evolutionary processes inevitably
and importantly contribute to the common origins and ordering of some
preferences that constitute every individual's utility curve.
Second, the brain is not a general, all-purpose, information processor.8 4
We know of no path by which natural selection could design such a thing.
There is no reason whatsoever to believe that evolution has designed the
human brain to yield either substantively or procedurally rational outcomes
in each and every circumstance in which the body may happen to find it-
ior that can be characterized as also maximizing the individual's interests. See generally ALCOCK, .supra
note 75; GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 75; GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND
NATURAL SELECTION (1966).
This distinction concerning the level of selection will only rarely be of practical significance, since
in the vast majority of contexts the "interests" of the individual and of the genes align. But there are
some circumstances in which they do not (in the same way that the interests of a labor union and a single
one of its members may occasionally diverge). And it will be in precisely those circumstances in which
the interests do diverge that behavior will appear to be most puzzling when viewed from the perspective
of rational individuals. For example, tendencies toward self-sacrificing behavior can spread through a
population through (among other pathways) the effects of self-sacrifice on the reproduction of kin, as
measured through standard inclusive fitness calculations (on which, see infra note 83). For a controver-
sial argument that, in some limited circumstances, natural selection can operate at the level of the group,
as well as at the level of the gene, see David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober, Reintroducing Group Selec-
tion to the Human Behavioral Sciences, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 585 (1994) (followed by extensive
peer commentary).
83 It is important to note that genetic success, or "fitness," is not measured in offspring alone, be-
cause offspring are not the only genetic relatives an individual has. Since relatives other than offspring,
such as siblings and parents, also share genes with an individual (because of recent shared ancestors),
their own reproductive success can in some circumstances contribute to an individual's fitness, When
calculating fitness, one therefore needs to take account of the extent to which an individual has increased
the reproductive success of its relatives (discounted by their degrees of relatedness), beyond the repro-
ductive success those relatives would have had in the absence of the individual's contributions. This
cumulative, additive calculation of fitness, which takes account of both direct and indirect replication of
genes, is known as "inclusive fitness." ALCOCK, supra note 75, at 561-69. Consequently, an organism
can increase its overall genetic success by increasing its inclusive fitness, even if it does not itself have
offspring.
84 While some still dispute this, the evidence is overwhelming, and growing. See, e.g., ROBERTO
CABEZA & ALAN KINGSTONE, HANDBOOK OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION (2001); TIlE
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF FACE PROCESSING (Nancy Kanwisher & Morris Moscovitch eds., 2000);
THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 1995); Truett Allison et al., Social Percep-
tionfron Visual Cues: Role of the STS Region, 4 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCl. 267 (2000); Michael S.
Gazzaniga, Organization of the Human Brain, 245 SCIENCE 947 (1989); Nancy Kanwisher, Domain
Specificity in Face Perception, 3 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 759 (2000).
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self.85 This renders importantly misleading any analogy of the brain to a
computer. Computers are general-purpose machinery into which software
is installed, whereas the brain comes prepackaged with a wide variety of in-
formation-processing predispositions. 
6
Third, the brain is a functionally specialized, context-specific informa-
tion processor, better at some tasks than at others. Like other aspects of ba-
sic anatomy, the basic internal psychological mechanisms leading to many
behavioral predispositions evolved under the challenges and selection pres-
sures posed by particular environmental conditions. Since natural selection
results in increasing frequencies of heritable traits that solve environmental
challenges in ways offering comparative gains in reproductive success, both
anatomical and behavioral traits tend to reflect incrementally, and histori-
cally-contingent, specialized solutions rather than optimal or universal ones.
Consequently, the brain is a path-dependent adaptation implementer, not a
general-purpose cost-benefit maximizer.
87
Fourth, the brain is better, on average, at confronting environmental
challenges that were frequently encountered during long periods of its adap-
tation than it is at confronting entirely novel challenges. Natural selection
is incapable of either looking forward, anticipating changes in environ-
mental conditions, or preplanning for change.
Fifth, evolutionary processes have left the brain designed, de facto, to
predispose its bearers toward behaviors that were adaptive (that is, they
contributed to reproductive success), on average, in the environment of evo-
lutionary adaptation (abbreviated, by convention, as "EEA").SS Because
85 In this respect, it may also be worth considering that some of the brain's obvious limitations are
themselves the products of tradeoffs between the costs of running it and the benefits of having it. The
human brain's unique capacities are, in part, a function of its size. Yet its size requires that human ba-
bies be born less physically developed and therefore more vulnerable than other primate babies-lest
larger cranial size pose even greater birthing problems than it already does. In addition, the brain re-
quires remarkable quantifies of energy to run: roughly 20%,1 of all calories consumed, despite being only
2% of body mass. PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOsOPIY 36-37 (1986). This is roughly
22 times as much energy as that required to nourish an equivalent weight of muscle, at rest. STEvEN
MITHEN, THE PREHISTORY OF MIND 11 (1996); see also Adam Gifford, Jr., Being and Time: On the Na-
ture and the Evolution oflnstitutions, I J. BIOECONOMICS 127, 136-37 (1999).
86 Very useful introductions to the subjects of these paragraphs appear in Leda Cosmides et al., In-
troduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration, in THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CuLTURE 3 (Jerome H. Barkowv et al. eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Cosmides, Introduction]; and John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological
Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND 19 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
87 See Cosmides, Introduction, supra note 86, at 7-9.
as For discussion, see Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Erchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped
How Humans Reason?, 31 COGNrTON 187 (1989). As Cosmides puts it:
The realization that the human mind evolved to accomplish adaptive ends indicates that natural se-
lection would have produced special-purpose, domain specific, mental algorithms-including
rules of inference-for solving important and recurrent adaptive problems... it is advantagcous to
reason adaptively, instead of logically, when this allows one to draw conclusions that are likely to
be true, but cannot be inferred by strict adherence to the propositional calculus. Adaptive algo-
rithns would be selected to contain expectations about specific domains that have proven reliable
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natural selection cannot anticipate environmental changes, or generate new
mutations in response to changes, there is generally a significant time lag
between change and adaptation. This lag is sharply increased by the rapid
pace of human cultural and technological development.89
Three brief clarifications. First, none of this should be understood, in
any way, to be genetically deterministic. Evolved predispositions are con-
text-specific, operating probabilistically, in species-typical, environment-
sensitive patterns. 90 Because probability is not inevitability, predispositions
do not guarantee any behavior from any individual. Second, none of this
implies any normative conclusion about brain design or current function.
Description is not prescription-nor is explanation justification. Third,
none of this exalts nature over nurture, or genes over culture. Arguing
about whether or not a given behavior is the product of genes or culture is
(as is often noted) like arguing about whether the area of a rectangle is the
product of its length or its width. 91 Nature and nurture are inseparably
intertwined, neither making sense without the other.92 All biological proc-
esses, including normal brain development, ultimately depend upon rich
environmental inputs. Similarly, all environmental influences can only be
perceived, sorted, analyzed, and understood through biological-and there-
fore evolutionary-processes. Sociality, culture, and learning are all reflec-
tions of the human brain and its evolved capacities. While it is true that
evolutionary processes have designed a human brain that both generates and
reciprocally responds to cultural influences, it is essential to recognize that a
number of important patterns in culture generation and perception reflect
deep cognitive structures of the brain, and the mindless handiwork of evolu-
tionary processes that enabled those structures to become widely shared by
members of the species.
The five propositions above, which address how evolutionary proc-
esses create information-processing, behavior-biasing features of the brain,
raise the following hypothesis: some behaviors currently ascribed to cogni-
over a species' evolutionary history. These expectations would differ from domain to domain.
Consequently, if natural selection had shaped how humans reason, reasoning about different do-
mains would be governed by different, content-dependent cognitive processes.
Id. at 193.
89 I am grateful to Professor John Robertson for pointing out that Wilson makes this point particu-
larly well in E.O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 181-82 (1998).
90 See generally sources cited supra note 75.
91 Since at least the 1950s, many have labored to expose the absurdity of the genes/culture dichot-
omy. See, e.g., DONALD OLDING HEBB, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 195-96 (2d ed. 1966); Anne
Anastasi, Herediy, Environment, and the Question "How? ", 65 PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 197 (1958); D.O.
Hebb, Heredity and Environment in Mammalian Behaviour, 1 BRIT. J. ANIMAL BEHAV. 43, (1953). Un-
fortunately, it persists. For cogent attacks on its oversimplicity, see MATr RIDLEY, supra note 75, at
175, 316-20, and Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton, Introduction: Nature, Nurture, and In-
Betiveen, in SEXUAL NATURE, SEXUAL CULTURE I (Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds.,
1995).
92 Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 285 (1999).
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tive limitations reflect not defect, but rather finely tuned features of brain
design. If so, we may gain important insights into the patterns of human ir-
rationality by combining our proximate causation analysis with our ultimate
causation analysis to yield a comprehensive evolutionary analysis.
The next two Parts explain why.
Ill. TIME-SHIFTED RATIONALITY
This Article develops, in this Part and the next, two tools of the evolu-
tionary analysis approach just described. In this Part, I explain why it
makes sense to reconceptualize some cognitive processes that lead to seem-
ing irrationalities as design features instead of defects, and provide several
brief examples.
A. Front Defects to Design
The current approach to bounded rationality, which BLE scholarship
reflects, is to assume that when people are substantively irrational it is be-
cause of (and in these oft-employed terms) cognitive fallibilities, frailties,
flaws, errors, defects, quirks, limitations, and imperfections. 93 These cogni-
tive errors and defects are, in turn, assumed to be (and by the vocabulary
used, are reciprocally reinforced as) the exclusive result of the internal and
external limits mentioned earlier (such as brain size and computing speed),
with net behavioral outcomes that are, while defective, at least understand-
able under the circumstances.
Over the years, a small group of scholars has attempted to bring eco-
nomics and biology closer together, generally.9' A few of them have even
93 So characterizing our cognitive faculties are, for examplc: BECKER, supra note 15; HOGARTH,
supra note 18, at 63, 204-06; RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CuRSE: PARADOXES AND
ANomALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 2-3 (1992); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY OF ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 21,
22 (1975); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. RE v. 23 (1989); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995); Jolls et al., supra note 1, at
1477; Barton L. Lipman, Information Processing and Bounded Rationaliy A Surry. CANADIAN J. OF
ECON. 42, 42-43 (February 1995); Posner, supra note 24, at 1553; Herbert A. Simon, From Substantive
to Procedural Rationality, in METHOD AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 129, 135 (Spiro J. Latsis cd.,
1976); Simon, Bounded Rationality, supra note 32, at 266-67; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1997); Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385,387-388, 390-400 (1989).
94 Among these, Gary Becker, Jack Hirshleifer, Paul Rubin, Richard Posner, and Robert Frank are
particularly significant Becker observed in 1976 that some tastes were likely selected through biologi-
cal pathways. Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Soclobiology, 14
J. ECON. LITERATURE 817 (1976). Hirshleifer, roughly contemporaneously, explored this idea at grater
length, and was the first economist to point out the deep connectivity betvcen, and parallel enterpris2s
of, economics and biology. Jack Hirshleifer, Economicsfroni a Biological VieN point, 20 J.L & ECOm'.
1, 37 (1977) ("Even emotional supports for exchange, like the sense of'justice ('moralistic aggression')
may represent genetically evolved characters."). Hirshlcifer notes that the fundamental economic con-
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speculated on the value of such conjunction in some irrationality contexts,
specifically.95 For example, in his recent comments on the BLE enterprise,
cepts of scarcity, competition, equilibrium, and specialization are as central to the study of evolved be-
havior as they are to the study of economics generally. Hirshicifer cites economist Alfred Marshall as
calling economics "a branch of biology, broadly interpreted," and Hirshleifer describes it as the study of
"Nature's economy." Id. at I n.2 (citing ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 772 (9th ed.
1920)). And Hirshleifer has continued, over the years, to offer bioeconomic perspectives on important
phenomena. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law, 4 RES. L. & ECON.
1 (1982); Jack Hirshleifer, The Bioeconomic Causes of War, 19 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 457
(1998).
Rubin noted that behavioral biology may materially undermine the standard economic assumption
that tastes are arbitrary, and explored an evolutionary explanation for tastes in such things as risk and
moralistic aggression. Paul Rubin & Chris Paul, An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk, 17 ECON.
INQUIRY 585 (1979); Paul Rubin, Evolved Ethics and Efficient Ethics, 3 J. ECON. BEtlAV. & ORO. 161
(June/Sept 1982); PAUL RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Posner offered a sustained effort to link sexual behavior
with economic behavior. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). And Frank has compellingly
argued (as has Hirshleifer) that in many contexts being predisposed to be "irrational" can prove advan-
tageous, even adaptive. ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988); Robert Frank, If Homo
Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 595 (1987); Jack Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises, In
THE LATEST ON THE BEST: ESSAYS IN EVOLUTION AND OPTIMALITY (John Dupre ed., 1987).
Works by other authors have also contributed in various ways to this disciplinary interchange. See
Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better Than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand,
84 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC. 327 (May 1994); Michael P. Ghiselin, Economy of Body, 68 AM.
ECON. REV. 233 (1978); Arthur J. Robson, A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-Expected Utility,
68 J. ECON. THEORY 397 (1996); Paul A. Samuelson, Modes of Thought in Economics and Biology, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1985); Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, Q.J.
ECON. 373 (July 1898); Ulrich Witt, Bioeconomics as Economics from a Darwinian Perspective, I J.
BIOECONOMICS 19 (1999); Ulrich Witt, Economics, Sociobiology, and Behavioral Psychology on Pref-
erences, 12 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 557 (1991); see also id. at 557 (noting several other sources); Paul J.
Zak & Arthur Denzau, Economics Is an Evolutionary Science, in EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES IN TIlE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE (Albert Somit &
Stephen Peterson eds., forthcoming 2001). SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BIOECONOMICS: THE THEORY OF
EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Peter Koslowski ed., 1999) collects several quite
recent chapters on this subject, including Michael T. Ghiselin, Darwinian Monism: The Economy of Na-
ture, id. at 7; Peter T. Saunders, Darwinism and Economic Theory, id. at 259; and Ulrich Witt, Evolu-
tionary Economics and Evolutionary Biology, id. at 279.
For a description of the historical ebbing and flowing of interchange between biology and econom-
ics, see GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION: BRINGING LIFE BACK INTO
ECONOMICS (1993).
95 Speculation on the possible relationship between biology and irrationality varies considerably.
See, e.g., HOGARTH, supra note 18, at 227, 232; Donald T. Campbell, Rationality and Utility from the
Standpoint of Evolutionary Biology, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY
AND ECONOMICS 171 (Robin Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds., 1987); Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 94,
at 330-31; Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence, supra note 60; Paul Gilbert, The Evolved Basis and
Adaptive Functions of Cognitive Distortions, 71 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 447 (1998) (discussing evolu-
tionary explanations for psychopathologies); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to
Pay Vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 89-90 (1993)
(discussing prospect theory and the endowment effect); Posner, supra note 24; Alan R. Rogers, Evolu-
tion of Time Preference by Natural Selection, AM. ECON. REV., June 1994, at 460; Ulen, supra note I, at
1760 (noting the implications of "hard-wired" cognitive limitations); Michael Waldman, Systematic Er-
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Judge Richard Posner has suggested that BLE could benefit from viewing
irrationality from an evolutionary biology perspective.96 And psychologist
Gerd Gigerenzer has forcefully argued that some supposed irrationalities
are experimental artifacts of providing information in forms that humans
did not typically encounter in ancestral environments.97 Nevertheless, one
can hardly avoid concluding that biology remains widely ignored in exist-
ing BLE scholarship, and that the argument for partnering behavioral biol-
ogy with behavioral economics needs a great deal of further development.
A biologically informed view of the brain makes clear that substantive
irrationalities are probably not just about physical, temporal, and informa-
tional limits. They are also, in some circumstances, likely to be about spe-
cific, narrowly tailored, efficiently operating features of brain design. My
argument here is that the traditional approach to bounded rationality and
decision-making is, in many cases, both descriptively wrong and materially
misleading. 98  It is descriptively wrong in the same way that it would be
wrong to say that a Porsche Boxster is "defective" when it fails to climb
logs and ford streams off road, or that a moth's brain is "defective" when
the moth flies into an artificial light source. It is materially misleading be-
cause to the extent that irrationalities are considered to be the result of de-
fects, rather than design features, their specific content is assumed to be,
though patterned ex post, unpredictable, unsystematized, and random ex
ante-rather than predictable, interrelated, and content-specific.99 Put an-
other way, turning old cognitive tools to entirely new uses introduces
changed circumstances, not defects. And the inappropriateness of old tools
to new uses does not mean those tools lack specialized design and function.
Understanding what the tools were designed to do provides significant pur-
rors and the Theory of Natural Selection, AI. ECON. REV., June 1994, at 482; Owen D. Jones, Law,
Behavioral Economics, and Evolution (April 16, 1999) (unpublished paper presented at The Olin Con-
ference on Evolution and Legal Theory at Georgetown University Law Center, on file with author).
96 See Posner, supra note 24 and infra notes 108, 128, and 136.
97 See Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence, supra note 60; Gerd Gigerenzer, Hon, to Make Cognitive
Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, in 2 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYOCOLOGY
83 (Wolfgang Strobe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1991) [hereinafter Gigernzer, Cognitive Illusions]; Gerd
Gigerenzer, Rationality: Why Social Context Matters, in INTERACTIVE MINDS: LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF COGNrrTON 319 (Paul B. Baltes & Ursula M. Staudinger eds., 1996);
Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Hcuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in SlIFLE
HEuISTIcs THAT MAKE Us SNsART (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 2000).
9S Indeed, the very term human "decision-making" is obfuscating. What is at issue is not how pro-
ple make decisions, but how people behave. Many of their behaviors do not reflect decisions in the
typical sense of that word.
99 For any given choice, many different irrational outcomes are possible. I am not suggesting that
the final distribution of outcomes is, or has been considered to be, random. For people tend to reach the
same kind of irrational outcome, when presented with similar choices. WVhat I am suggesting, instead, is
that traditional approaches, while noting the patterned outcomes, have no systematic way of predicting
that human behavior will cluster around one irrational result rather than another. That is, the content of
the irrationality can appear to be random, even while the accumulated human behavior is patterned.
This will be illustrated in section III.B.1, infra.
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chase on explaining and predicting how they will function when applied in
novel contexts.
We know that brains are highly specialized organs, which natural se-
lection has left designed to perform very specific tasks. 00 And we know
that, because of the way evolutionary processes work, the information proc-
essing tasks for which the brain is best adapted are those relating to infor-
mation, challenges, and environments of deep ancestral time, rather than the
present time. (Except in those cases in which present conditions are the
same as those in the past).
The consequence of this, it follows, is that we not only should allow
for, but should indeed expect, that there will be times when a perfectly
functioning brain-functioning precisely as it was designed to function-
will incline us toward behavior that, viewed only in the present tense and
measured only by outcomes in current environments, will appear to be sub-
stantively irrational. This is simply because the brain was designed to proc-
ess information in ways tending to yield behaviors that were substantively
rational in different environments than the ones in which we now find our-
selves.
This calls the assumptions of the traditional approach to bounded ra-
tionality into serious question. For instance, the traditional approach as-
sumes that rationality should be measured solely in the present tense-
evaluating current behavior, in current environments, for current outcomes.
The temporal, historical dimension to information-processing that evolu-
tionary analysis affords suggests something quite different. It suggests, in
essence, that a great deal of what is currently lumped under the over-
inclusive and somewhat dismissive heading "bounded rationality" is a func-
tion of discrete contexts in which there is a temporal mismatch between de-
sign features appropriate for ancestral environments, on one hand, and quite
different current environments, on the other. In what follows, and in order
to bridge the gap separating behavioral biology scholarship from behavioral
law and economics scholarship, I will refer to the results of this temporal
mismatch of historically adaptive behavior and modem environments as
time-shifted rationality or TSR. Specifically, time-shifted rationality de-
scribes any trait resulting from the operation of evolutionary processes on
brains that, while increasing the probability of behavior that was adaptive in
the relevant environment of evolutionary adaptation in the ancestral past,
leads to substantively irrational or maladaptive behavior in the present envi-
ronment. In other words, poor behavior choices sometimes derive not from
brain defects, per se, by rather from the brain's deployment of old, once-
successful techniques in the face of new problems. So before judging the
brain's abilities, we need to consider the effects of its choices in the envi-
ronments for which the brain is principally adapted.
Time-shifted rationality-a kind of evolutionary lag, or novel envi-
oo See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 75.
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ronment effect, that leads to maladaptation-can describe physical as well
as mental phenomena. The physical ones, because they are more obvious,
can provide preliminary illustration. For example, current scholarship on a
variety of physical ailments examines the consequences of mismatch be-
tween body design and changed conditions.101 The research reveals that
stress automatically reduces your immediate ability to digest, to grow, and
to have sex. This was good in the EEA, the environment of evolutionary
adaptation. During periods of extreme stress it was adaptive to temporarily
shut down all systems not immediately dedicated to addressing a crisis at
hand, such as running away from a predator. Historically, most extreme
stresses were of rather limited duration: either you got away, or you didn't.
And most severe but survivable stresses passed more quickly than multi-
district litigations, lengthy divorce proceedings, or corporate takeovers.
That does not make the modem body's stress response defective when it in-
terferes with digestion, growth, and reproduction. It renders the body's
stress response substantively rational but temporally mismatched-a time-
shifted rationality.
My argument here is that just as many modem physical ailments reflect
the body's well-honed approach to ancestral problem solving, many sup-
posed cognitive errors reflect the brain's well-honed approach to ancestral
problem solving. We will do no better to understand and combat irration-
alities without evolutionary analysis than we will do in understanding and
combating stress responses without evolutionary analysis. 02 The main
point is that we err when we attempt to understand supposed irrationalities
without the temporal, historical dimension that behavioral biology affords.
The next section provides examples.
B. Examples
This section briefly explores a variety of contexts in which an evolu-
tionary analysis, applying the tool of time-shifted rationality, may help to
illuminate seemingly irrational behaviors. In some cases, this suggests that
they may be substantively rational behavior, temporally mismatched to the
101 See, eg., RANDOLPH M. NESSE & GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, WiY WE GET Sim THE NEW,
SCIENCE OF DARWINIAN MEDICINE (1994); ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WIIY ZEBRAS DON'T GET ULCERS:
AN UPDATED GUIDE TO STRESS, STRESs-RELATED DISEASES, AND COPING (1998).
102 Similarly, an evolutionary perspective on other physical ailments has provided new and useful
insights. See generally NESSE & WILLIAMS, supra note 101. For eamplc, wvhile fever was long con-
sidered to be an adverse byproduct of bacterial infection-something to be suppressed-it is now knownm
to be part of a suite of evolved anti-bacterial counter-measures that help to inhibit rapid bacterial growth.
In cases of life-threatening infections, of course, life-threatening fevers may result. In ordinary cases,
however, suppressing fever actually weakens the body's ability to fight infection. Similar thinking has
led to breakthroughs in understanding the connections between evolved nausea and ingested substantces
that, while harmless to a developed body, interfere with proper development of a fetus. See. e.g., Sam-
uel M. Flaxman & Paul W. Sherman, Morning Sickness: A Mechanism for Protceting Mother and Em-
bryo, 75 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 113 (2000).
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current environment. The examples begin with comparatively straightfor-
ward contexts, involving inconsistent preferences, and later conclude with
the more challenging applications of TSR, such as in the context of en-
dowment effects. In each case, the purpose of the example is to demon-
strate how the hypothesis of TSR yields a novel and promising perspective.
1. Inconsistent Preferences.-The rational actor model, at the heart
of economic analysis of law, depends on people having consistent prefer-
ences.10 3 The existence (and persistence) of inconsistent preferences there-
fore poses a significant problem. A seemingly trivial example-poor
dieting behavior-has large implications if it is as representative of incon-
sistent preferences as many fear it to be.
The problem of poor dieting is simply this: dieting individuals often
appear to behave irrationally, given their self-expressed ordering of prefer-
ences. They may value losing weight more highly than eating ice cream,
but later make for the fridge. Such inconsistent preferences pose important
legal implications when, for example, government regulators attempt to en-
courage retirement savings.10 4 The overweight dieter who eats sweets is not
materially different from someone who refuses to take a personal loan at ten
percent interest, while carrying substantial credit card debt at eighteen per-
cent interest.
A neoclassical economist can solve this inconsistent preferences prob-
lem in one of four equally unsatisfactory ways. She can suppose that the
seemingly inconsistent dieter a) acted rationally, having lied about his pref-
erences; b) acted rationally, having earlier misjudged his own preferences;
c) acted rationally, having simply changed his preferences later; or d) acted
irrationally, and thus inconsequentially.
The first two explanations (lying and misjudging) are inconsistent with
most people's personal experiences with dieting, and seem both facile and
implausible. The third explanation, if allowed, would reduce economics to
nothing more than descriptions of what people actually do. And the fourth
explanation, most often invoked, seems suspiciously convenient. Even
more telling (and reminiscent of the singing bird example, earlier), it pro-
vides no explanation for why people are so much more likely to overeat,
when acting irrationally, than they are to undereat. And it provides no ex-
planation for why people are so much more likely to overeat sweets, when
acting irrationally, than they are to overeat sours or rotting foods.
Evolutionary analysis, with this tool of time-shifted rationality and its
103 MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 14, at 57.
104 For information on self-control generally, see Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 19. Regarding sav-
ings, specifically, the New York Times reports that 40% of American families would run out of cash
within three days of a layoff or medical crisis. Brendan I. Koerner, Where to Go When You're Broke,
NEw YORK TIMES MAG., Oct. 15, 2000, at 104. While there is obviously far more to low savings than
simply inconsistent preferences, it appears likely that inconsistent preferences are an important part of
the picture.
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emphasis on the ultimate causation half of the full causation equation, pro-
vides a fifth alternative: that the behavior occurs because a powerful pre-
disposition to pursue sweets was once "rational" (or "adaptive") and simply
is so no longer.105 It is, in essence, a substantively rational predisposition
that has been obsolesced by events.
The analysis begins with the obvious: it is no accident that humans, all
across the planet, have a strong preference for sweets over sours or bitters.
In ancestral environments, natural selection favored heritable traits that bi-
ased nervous systems toward associating pleasure with the perception of
chemical stimuli that happened to be present in foods of high caloric value.
A taste for sweets was highly adaptive, and differentially reproduced in
successive generations, simply because it tended to lead organisms that had
it toward foods of high caloric value, which enhanced their survival and re-
production.
In ancestral environments, sweet foods (such as ripe fruit) never con-
tained caloric concentrations high enough, and in sufficient quantity, to
yield maladaptive obesity. Consequently the selection pressure favoring a
strong desire for sweets was never countered by any selection pressure
against over-eating sweets. Our modem environment presents an evolu-
tionarily novel environmental feature: refined sugar. Eating too much can
be unhealthy, and we can recognize this at the conscious level. Neverthe-
less, we are left with a brain-essentially a living fossil-that natural selec-
tion shaped to crave sweets. Doing so was "rational" in the environment in
which our brain's behavior-biasing functions were formed. Although we
may break diets in a way that appears irrational, our behavior is both highly
patterned rather than random (none gorge on sour or rotting food, for in-
stance) and also explicable as the product of rational, economic forces.
If explaining this particular irrationality as a product of time-shifted ra-
tionality looks easy, that's because it is. The proximate cause of overeating
is that sweets taste good. The ultimate cause of overeating is that natural
selection strongly favors the consumption of high calorie foods, and the ul-
tra-high calorie foods available today, that make over-consumption possi-
ble, were never present in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. This
is why people tend to overeat rather than undereat, and why, when they do
so, they tend to overeat sweets rather than sours or spoiled cabbage.
Of course, not every example of inconsistent preferences can be so eas-
ily addressed. But this straightforward example illustrates why evolution-
ary analysis provides such a useful starting point any time we are concerned
about behaviors that are odd, in their nature, but quite common, in their fre-
J05 This particular illustration, though not yet widely known outside biology circles, is often used to
illustrate the ways in which once-adaptive behavior can become maladaptive. The argument I am at-
tempting to extend is that a similar phenomenon can occur with respect to more abstract mental proc-
esses, and that this phenomenon can be understood to explain many of the seeming lapcs from
rationality that seem to so trouble economists.
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quency of occurrence. And the first two steps of such analysis are often il-
luminating in themselves. First, assume that behavior-biasing information
processing has been quite systematically shaped by evolutionary forces.
Second, examine the supposed irrationality at issue through a temporal lens
that puts it in the time and in the situational context of the environment dur-
ing which relevant human brain functions likely evolved.
2. Over-Cooperativeness.-Although the rational actor model does
not predict anything as simplistic as unbrokenly selfish behavior, it does
predict that costly acts without any visible possibility of benefit will be rare.
This is why the commonplace practice of leaving tips when dining "on the
road," for example, is so puzzling to economists-and so seemingly irra-
tional. We already know that in repeat-player contexts even seemingly al-
truistic acts can yield important payoffs through later cooperation and
reciprocal altruism.1 6 But why do even people dining alone (and out of
view of acquaintances) regularly leave tips for service already rendered in a
restaurant far from home or overseas?
In an attempt to solve this and other puzzles of greater-than-predicted
cooperativeness, economists often resort to the notion of "psychic income."
That is, they simply posit a taste for tipping, in which tipping on the road
gives one a sense of pleasure, and thus confers some benefit larger than the
cost. This is, of course, an explanation in terms of proximate causation-in
the same way that "because it tastes good" explains eating sweets, or "be-
cause it feels good" explains sex. But this psychic income, proximate cause
answer-like those for sweets or sex-provides no very satisfactory expla-
nation. It simply begs the question: why do so many people perceive this
particular behavior to be sufficiently pleasurable to pay for it? Why, that is,
is tipping more pleasurable than stiffing?
Time-shifted rationality offers a plausible hypothesis, grounded in ul-
timate causation analysis, for why it will never be coin-flipping odds
whether tipping or stiffing will be more pleasurable to humans. The TSR
analysis suggests that seemingly irrational tipping exists because of the
adaptive value of reciprocal altruism (and reputation effects) operative in
small communities, notwithstanding the fact that technology has quite re-
cently made such communities rare. We know that in small communities
greater codependence and interaction of members makes reputation impor-
tant. It is therefore adaptive to be known as generous, honest, and coopera-
tive (though not indiscriminately so) in a small society. We know that
tendencies toward reciprocal altruism are both adaptive and heritable in
many other social species. 10 7 And we have good reason to believe that for
106 See, e.g., HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION
TO MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR (2000).
107 Reciprocal altruism is the dominant explanation for unselfish acts between non-kin in animal
populations. The concept traces to Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 35 (1971).
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the overwhelming bulk of their evolutionary history our hominid ancestors
lived in small groups. Moreover, we see cross-cultural evidence of recipro-
cally altruistic behavior in human populations. It is therefore not only pos-
sible but probable that humans bear evolved predispositions toward
reciprocal altruism.
If so, it is easy to see how some novel environmental features, when
bumping up against such predispositions, could create puzzling phenomena
such as tipping on the road and other seeming overcooperativeness. That
tipping on the road appears irrational in an explosively burgeoned society-
in which one travels by methods previously unavailable, to distances previ-
ously untraveled, to meet strangers in numbers never before encountered,
whom one is unlikely ever to encounter again-does not automatically
mean that such tipping is the product of a malfunctioning brain, or one that
has simply internalized a random norm.108 Instead, it probably reflects
time-shifted rationality, in which a generally adaptive predisposition is
temporally mismatched to today's evolutionarily unique conditions.
This is not, of course, to say that tipping is itself an adaptation. But
tipping and similarly altruistic behavior may often be a by-product of
evolved psychological mechanisms that both preferentially generate and re-
ciprocally internalize local norms that encourage cooperative behavior in
contexts that would have had important consequences for reputation and re-
productive success in deep ancestral environments.
10 9
3. Intertemporal Choice Anomalies and Irrationally Discounted
Futures.-Rational choice theorists generally assume that people evaluate
the future sensibly. For example, people should discount to present value
any right to receive a sum certain, on a specified future date, according to
expected interest rates on investments across the intervening time. None-
theless, people regularly discount the future at extraordinary (or "hyper-
bolic") rates, which are themselves inconstant. '10 Researchers have noted
108 Posner notes the following, in the context of a discussion about altruism in ancestral environ-
ments:
[lit would not have been essential to have an innate capacity to discriminate between relatives and
other intimates, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those people--call them "strangers"-
with whom one did not have repeated face-to-face interactions. Nowvadays we interact a great deal
with strangers. But our instincts are easily fooled when confronted with conditions to .,hich hu.
man beings never had a chance to adapt biologically.
Posner, supra note 24, at 1561.
109 1 provide a discussion of how evolutionary processes influence norns in Jones, supra note 8.
1t1o See generally Kris N. Kirby & P_ J. Hermstein, Preference Reversals Due To Myapic Discount-
ing of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYcHOL SCI. 83 (March 1995); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prele,
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 QJ. ECON. 573 (1992).
As Kirby and Herrnstein explain:
[R]esults are consistent with models of impulsiveness that assume that deferred outcomes are dis-
counted hyperbolically, and such results are a direct challenge to standard economic theory. The
constancy of discount rates assumed by economic theory predicts that subjects should never con-
sistently reverse their preference from an SER [smaller, earlier rewtard] to an LLR [larger, later
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not only that people often prefer to receive a smaller good now over a dis-
proportionately greater good later, but also that people reverse this prefer-
ence as the delay for receiving either good increases in equal amounts.
nI
This seems irrational. For example, the fact that a majority of adults would
rather receive $50 now than $100 in two years-at the same time that virtu-
ally no one prefers $50 in four years to $100 in six years-is seen as clear
evidence of "anomalies in the utilitarian reasoning of the normal human
adult."" 12 And this both hyperbolic and anomalous discounting has impor-
tant implications for whether paternalistic policies, such as the forced sav-
ings of social security, can be justified at both theoretical and empirical
levels. Rational people are delayed gratification people, who plan for the
future. But hyperbolic discounters will not save enough for retirement."M
It is likely a mistake to conclude that seemingly irrationally discounted
futures are necessarily the function of calculating errors. Evolutionary
analysis suggests an ultimate cause explanation." 4 Hyperbolic discounting
may reflect another time-shifted rationality. How might modem environ-
mental features differ from features of the environment of evolutionary ad-
aptation in ways that render once-adaptive predispositions maladaptive?
reward] as the delays to both rewards are changed by constant amounts of time . ... These ex-
periments are the first with humans, using real rewards, to document individual intertempoml
preference reversals and to locate the delays at which those reversals occur ....
Kirby & Hermstein, supra, at 88. Kirby and Hermstein found that "[i]n all three experiments, an over-
whelming majority of subjects reversed their preferences systematically as a function of delay." Id. at
85.
1 See, e.g., George Ainslie, Derivation of "Rational" Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Dis.
count Curves, 81 AM. ECON. ASSOC. PAPERS AND PROc. 334 (1991). Similar evidence comes from the
frustrating frequency with which people will persist in purchasing less expensive but energy-hungry ap-
pliances when the difference between the price of that appliance and a more expensive but less energy-
hungry appliance would be earned back in energy savings within a year. See, e.g., George Loewenstein
& Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181, 182-83.
112 Id. at 334.
113 For discussion of the legal implications of this phenomenon, see Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalis-
tic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CIII. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
"Left to their own devices, many people will not save enough for their old age. This hard truth about
human behavior has led American government to make a long and expensive commitment to retirement
security programs." Id. at 1275; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 1023, 1027 ("[I]t
seems probable that behavior economics increasingly will be invoked by those who favor government
intervention precisely because behavioral economics offers a new line of argument in favor of regulating
private conduct.")
114 There is, reportedly, some evidence for hyperbolic discounting in other animals. See Kirby &
Herrnstein, supra note 110, at 83. Only two authors, to my knowledge, have specifically explored the
possibility that human time preferences may have evolved. Rogers, supra note 95, provides an elegant
argument for why human time preferences may be in evolutionary equilibrium. Gifford, while agree-
ing that time preferences are likely to reflect the operation of evolutionary processes, argues that "the
rate of time preference that resulted from cultural coevolution of large brains, language and con-
sciousness diverged from ... the rate of time preference in biological fitness." Gifford, supra 85, at
139-40.
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First, average life expectancy has skyrocketed.'t 5 And high discount rates
make sense when life expectancy is short. Second, for nearly all of the
roughly seventy million years of primate evolution, there was no such thing
as a reliable future, let alone a reliable future payoff. Even under the most
generous definition of investment, investment horizons were short. Third, a
"right" to receive something in the future is a trivially recent invention of
modem humanity.
Since long lives, reliable futures, and reliable rights to future payoffs
were not part of the environment in which the modem brain was slowly
built, it is not particularly surprising that the modem brain tends to steeply
discount the value of a future benefit compared to an immediate one, and is
not particularly well equipped to reach the outcome currently deemed most
rational. Rather than assume that people will be rational discounters, we
should, logically, expect and assume the opposite: most often people will
be hyperbolic discounters. In the EEA, the environment of evolutionary
adaptation, the kind of hyperbolic discounting that humans now so regularly
exhibit often would have led to more substantively rational results than the
alternative.
Put another way, at almost no time in human evolutionary history
could there have been a selection pressure that regularly favored the kind of
coolly calculated and deferred gratification now deemed to be so reason-
able. Selection pressures can only result from the differential reproduction
of contemporaneously existing alternatives in light of regularly encountered
environmental features. So, absent a regular environmental feature that of-
fered a "guarantee" of future payoff, future payoffs would be quite specula-
tive. Consequently, foregoing immediate payoffs would often be irrational,
and thus subject to selection pressure against such delayed satisfaction.
4. Framing Problems and Mistaken Assessments of Probability.-
The rational actor model assumes that most of the time people will neither
be misled by meaningless differences between options, nor make gross er-
rors in calculating the probabilities of events. The facts indicate other-
wise.' 16  People often make different choices, between functionally
equivalent options, depending on how the options are posed, or "framed."
And people routinely misunderstand probabilities. This has obvious and
far-reaching implications for legal decision making, risk assessment, and
115 For a summary of a Center for Disease Control report on the increase in life expcancy in the
United States (from 47.3 years to 76.1 years), see Patricia J. Mays, Life Expectancy Climbs Nearly 30
Years Since 1900, DAYTON (OH.) DAILY NEWS, July 29, 1999, at 8A. For a treatment by the National
Academy of Sciences of modem, international, and ancestral life expectancy, see BETVIWE! ZEUS AND
THE SALION: THE BIODENIOGRAPHY OF LONGEVITY (Kenneth W. Wachter & Caleb E. Finch eds.,
1997), at http-//vww.nap.edufbooksI0309057876fhtil indc'.htnl.
116 See, eg., Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23; Amos Tvcrs.%y &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
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sensible reactions to changing incentives.
In view of what we know about how evolutionary processes shape in-
formation-processing organs, we should expect that people's preferences
for different outcomes will often vary as a function of the ways, and the
formats, in which questions are posed. This will be particularly likely
whenever one option is presented in a form that is more consonant than the
other with the form in which options were regularly encountered in the
EEA. This is because the brain is functionally specialized in a context- and
content-specific way. Thus the more closely a problem resembles, in opera-
tive part, a problem faced by our ancestors, the more likely it is to invoke
evolved, context-specific mechanisms. These may or may not yield the
same behavioral inclination that dispassionate cost-benefit analysis
would. ' 7 The brain may therefore reflect time-shifted rationality, because
it is better adapted to bias behavior appropriately in the face of an histori-
cally common problem than it is in the face of a novel one.
For example, psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, in studies
informed by evolutionary analysis, discovered that when two logically
equivalent problems were posed to test subjects, one involving compara-
tively abstract rules (e.g., "if a person has a 'D' rating, then his documents
must be marked code '3"'), and the other involving the possibility of detect-
ing someone else's cheating on a social bargain (e.g., if Betty used the
company car on Sunday, then it was not on business) far fewer people
reached the "rational" result in the former context than in the latter (roughly
forty percent, compared to eighty-eight percent)."t 8 The Cosmides and
Tooby studies provide strong evidence for an evolved, functionally special-
ized psychological "cheater-detection" mechanism, which was (and still is)
obviously adaptive. That is, the human brain appears to be specifically alert
"to detect violations of conditional rules when these can be interpreted as
cheating on a social contract."'" 9 The consequence of this line of reasoning
is that, by considering the environmental features common to the time dur-
ing which the brain evolved, we may not only explain but also predict pat-
terns of variation in modem human ability to solve problems.
Linking errors in probability assessment to errors consequent to fram-
ing effects, Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues have recently argued that sup-
posedly robust errors in statistical, probabilistic reasoning disappear entirely
when probabilistic information is refrained in terms of frequency distribu-
117 For example, this explains why people are more afraid ofsnakes than cars, although the latter are
far more dangerous.
118 Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED
MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163, 182, 205 (Jerome H.
Barkow et al. eds., 1992). The problems were, of course, more sophisticated than the examples used
here (for the sole purpose of distinguishing the kinds of problems) otherwise indicate. See id. for a full
description.
119 Id. at 205.
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tions.120 The argument, in essence, is that it was never coin-flipping odds
whether humans would be equally good at handling decimals and percent-
ages (the vocabulary of probability) or at handling integers (the vocabulary
of frequency distributions). Because the overwhelming abundance of data
observable in the EEA appeared in the natural sampling form of event fre-
quencies, the brain is likely to be better adapted to making substantively ra-
tional choices on the basis of frequency distributions than on the basis of
more abstract, and only recently invented, statistical probability representa-
tions. Gigerenzer's evolutionarily informed analysis explains why, and
predicts that, for example, people will typically have a far more realistic as-
sessment of risk when told that eight people out of ten died after eating a
plant, than they will when told that eating a plant carries a ".8" risk of
death. 121
Gigerenzer's approach makes use of the image of an "adaptive tool-
box" into which the brain reaches for "fast and frugal heuristics."'12 When
problems come in unfamiliar forms, the tool-which was "ecologically ra-
tional" in ancestral times-may be confounded. Gigerenzer's model em-
phasizes the extent to which, by changing the current format of information
to be compatible with what the brain evolved to expect, irrationalities and
other failures will "disappear" and a rational result can follow.'2 That ap-
proach is extremely useful, and not incompatible with the time-shifted ra-
tionality approach I describe here. But it does not appear to connect an
evolutionary explanation for framing effects with the other effects explored
here, such as endowment effects, hyperbolic discounting, and the like. TSR
can provide such connection. Additionally, the TSR approach predicts that,
even when the information is in a format encountered during ancestral
times, brain mechanisms will often lead to outcomes that are irrational in
the present tense. That is, TSR underscores that there will be many times
when the brain's predisposition toward a seemingly irrational result is not
just a function of its inability to process environmental information with
which it is unfamiliar, but is instead a function of being designed to yield a
substantively different outcome than one that would now be appropriate-
even if the format of the information it processes is identical to that to
which the brain is adapted.
5. Ultimatum Ganzes and The Irrational Taste for Spite.-Rational
actors prefer some benefit to no benefit. Now famous experiments, how-
ever, reveal many contexts in which the people choose no benefit over
120 See, e.g., Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence, supra note 60, at 11-15; Gigerenzer, Cognitive Il-
lusions, supra note 97; Gerd Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probubilistic Mental Models, in
RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 284 (Y-.. Manktelaw & D.E. Over
eds., 1993).
121 Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 97.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Gigerenzer, Cognitive Illusions, supra note 97.
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benefit. In the so-called "ultimatum game," for example, two subjects face
the following scenario.124 The first subject is given a sum of money. She
must then propose, to the second subject, how to divide the money between
them. If the second subject agrees to the proposed split, each keeps the
money according to that split. If, instead, he rejects the proposed split, nei-
ther subject keeps any money.
A moment's thought reveals that the second subject, acting rationally,
should accept any split by which he receives anything at all. Because any-
thing is better than nothing. The first subject, seeing the wisdom of this,
should propose to give the second subject one penny and keep the balance
of the sum for herself.
In reality, however, the second subject rejects many proposed splits,
rather than none. He is particularly likely to do so when he would share
less than about twenty percent of the total. This appears to be evidence of a
widespread but seemingly irrational taste for spite. It takes this form: for
the benefit of inflicting a greater cost on another, one inflicts a cost on him-
self. This finding has legal relevance because rational individuals would
not be expected, for example, "to pursue even meritorious legal claims if
their expected recovery is less than the attorney's fees, costs, and other ex-
penses involved."'125 And yet people regularly do.
Evolutionary analysis suggests an explanation. We know from game
theory that condition-dependent (in this case, retaliatory) spitefulness can be
a feature of an evolutionarily stable strategy for reaping gains from cooP2;
erators, punishing defectors, and encouraging cooperative outcomes.
And research suggests there are biological underpinnings to a sense of fair-
ness. 127 It is adaptive to identify cheaters, and to be identified as a non-
124 See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 237-39 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing ul-
timatum game); Sheryl Ball & Catherine C. Eckel, The Economic Value of Status, 27 J. SOClO-
ECONOMICS 495, 497 (1998) (discussing ultimatum game, and citing much of the recent literature). See
generally Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1995, at 209; Wemer Guth et al., An ExperimentalAnalysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982); W. Guth & R. Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Com.
parison of Experimental Results, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990).
125 DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 288
(1992).
126 An early model appears in W.D. Hamilton, Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary
Model, 228 NATURE 1218 (1970). See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR (L.A. Dugatkin & Hudson Kern Reeve eds., 1998);
JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). A recent book demonstrating
the general value of game theoretic approaches to behavior is POSNER, supra note 16.
127 This theme is explored in, among other places, MAT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN
INSTINCrS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996). See also RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE
BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS (1987); LARRY ARNHART, DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT: THIE
BIOLOGICAL ETHICS OF HUMAN NATURE (1998); FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF
RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOOICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY (James P. Hurd ed., 1996) [hereinafter INVESTIGATING
BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS]; THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D.
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sucker-someone not easily exploited.128 Consequently, the predisposition
to act spitefully when being unfairly exploited by a stingy cooperator may
be a time-shifted rationality, underpinning seemingly irrational behavior in
modem contexts.
6. Endowment Effects and The Irrational Pricing of Property.-As
mentioned earlier, the rational actor model, as reflected in the Coase Theo-
rem, predicts that the value one ascribes to a good (or to a right) will be sta-
ble, and unaffected by whether one already happens to own it. Much
empirical evidence suggests the contrary.12 9 The strength of the preference
to own is seemingly irrationally contingent on whether or not one already
does own. And the legal implications for the initial distribution of rights
and resources are potentially profound.1
30
BLE scholarship presently lacks satisfactory explanations for this phe-
nomenon.'13  The effort to model the behavior is complicated, scholars note,
by seemingly peculiar variations, by context, in the size of the endownent
effect. For example, in a famous series of experiments researchers discov-
ered that the effect is present for drinking mugs, but absent for tokens rep-
resenting the right to a mug.132  While it is clear that, psychologically,
losses loom larger than gains, BLE lacks any meta-explanation for why this
is so. Was it just coin-flipping odds, for example, whether people would
exhibit loss aversion instead of gain aversion-or whether recently acquired
goods would be endowed rather than un-endowed (or "anti-endowed")?
Not likely. If we approach the endowment effect with a TSR lens, we
can see that certain evolutionarily novel features make the endowment pre-
Masters & Margaret Grter eds., 1992) [hereinafter SENSE OF JUSTICE]; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL
SENSE (1993); Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 337 (Charles Crawford ed., 1998).
For recent discussion, see Jones, supra note 8; RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS, supra note 94.
128 Posner briefly aired an alternative, but still evolutionary, hypothesis in Posner, supra note 24.
He suggested that rejection of unfair bargains may be a result of the adaptive value ofpride. Id. at 1564.
129 See. eg., Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 95, at 89-90; Daniel Kahneman ct al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, reprinted in RICHARD H. THALEt , QUASI-
RATIONAL ECONOMICS 167 (1991); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of
Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989); Jack L Knetsch & J.A. Sinden,
Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence ofan Unexpected Disparity
in Measures of Value, 99 QJ. ECON. 507 (1984); George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias In the
Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929 (1995).
130 See, eg., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(199 1); Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 28; see also discussion supra subpart I.B.
131 See discussion supra subpart I.C.
132 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effec,. Loss Aversion. and Status Quo
Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 195-197; see also Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects,
Other-Regarding Preferences and Corporate Law, Olin Working Paper No. 00-2 USC Law School at 45
(April 21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("As noted above, however, numerous
studies have suggested that subjects tend not to endow goods that are predominantly stores of value for
future trade or production.").
1183
95:1141 (2001)
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183 2000-2001
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disposition seem irrational in present environments. Principally, the ab-
stract notion of tradable "rights" to things, which we now take for granted,
is a wholly modem invention in the history of mammals. Never before, in
the history of natural selection, could a selection pressure have favored the
ability to process information about a thing itself in precisely the same way
as information about a right to a thing-even if such a trait were to have
arisen.
This perspective may help explain some oft-noted but unexplained ab-
errations in observed endowment effects. For example, it helps explain ex-
perimental findings that a mug in hand is endowed, while a token
representing a right to a mug is not. 133 The TSR perspective also sug ests
that while researchers have attempted to control for wealth effects, the
brain may still reflect a time-shifted rationality appropriate for ancestral en-
vironments that generally lacked any sequestrable overabundance of re-
sources.
TSR also suggests another hypothesis: that the reason losses loom lar-
ger than gains, in humans, shares a common origin with the reason losses
loom larger than gains in so many other species. There is much written in
133 I am not implying that people will be incapable, as a function of evolutionary history, of valuing
tokens or money. I am suggesting that, as a product of TSR, the psychological mechanisms by which
money is valued are hardly likely to be identical to the psychological mechanisms by which goods are
valued-notwithstanding the fact that in today's environment it would be rational that they should be.
Moreover, it may be incorrect to conclude, as some have, from experiments matching goods with
goods, goods with money, and money with tokens (a form of money), that goods are endowed while
money is not. It would be interesting to know whether the endowment effect for a given good will be
larger when that good is to be bought with or sold for money than when that good is to be bought with or
sold for other goods. Although I have not researched the matter thoroughly, I have not yet come across
any experiment that compares the size of the endowment effects, for a single good, in these two different
contexts. Such an experiment might involve, for example, first establishing (through both selling and
purchasing scenarios) the endowment effect for some number of mugs exchanged for cash, and then
comparing that result to the endowment effect, similarly exposed, when some number of mugs are ex-
changed (again in both purchasing and selling scenarios) for some number of other valued goods, such
as houseplants.
Note that this hypothesis is consistent with the otherwise unexplained experimental finding that the
endowment effect for mugs is much smaller when transactions involved the sale for cash of vouchers for
mugs, rather than the mugs themselves. One implication of this line of reasoning is that people will tend
not to value the "right" to a thing as much as they will value the thing itself, since it is only trivially re-
cently in human evolutionary history that a "right" to something could be traded (and thus only recently
that selection pressures could begin to operate systematically on psychological mechanisms that value
such intangibles). There is recent evidence consistent with this hypothesis. See Rachlinski & Jourden,
supra note 28.
Note that there is some evidence, however, for the endowment ofsome kinds of rights, notwithstand-
ing the apparent fact that many rights are wholly unendowed. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998). This clearly requires further study,
both empirical work to identify distinctions between endowed and unendowed rights, and theoretical
work to explain distinctions that may emerge.
134 The wealth effect, simplified, is what makes a single sandwich more valuable to someone living
in poverty than it would be to someone living in luxury.
1184
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1184 2000-2001
Tinme-Shifted Rationality and tMe Law of Law,'s Leverage
behavioral biology documenting the widespread phenomenon in territorial
systems that residents of a territory almost invariably defeat challengers. 3 5
Although the literature does not refer to it in terms of "endowment effects,"
observational and experimental evidence suggests that defenders of territory
routinely ascribe a higher value to what they have than they ascribe to the
same territory if they have to procure it from another. That is, they fight
harder to defend a territory than they do to reacquire it, once it has been
transferred to another. A leading hypothesis for this well-known and well-
studied phenomenon is that there are payoff asymmetries favoring residents
(as in, for example, the different future costs to challenger and resident of
having to negotiate boundaries with neighbors). The adaptive value of a
predisposition to hang on to what you have, once you have managed to get
it, may provide both an empirical and a theoretical foundation for under-
standing and predicting the endowment effect in humans.
3 6
C. Out of Bounds: A Summary
A principal insight of economics was to redescribe legal sanctions as
prices. A principal insight of behavioral biology is to redescribe emotions,
preferences, and other behavior-biasing, information-processing mecha-
nisms as, in many cases, evolved adaptations (or in some cases by-products
of adaptations) that increase the probability of behaviors that were useful in
solving problems faced by our human and non-human ancestors. My ar-
gument is that these evolved adaptations underlie some of the seemingly ir-
rational behavior that appears inconsistent with rational choice theory.
None of the examples just ventured above was intended to provide ir-
refutable proof that the phenomenon at issue is, in fact, a neurological arti-
fact of our evolved brain. Rather, the examples were intended first to
suggest the general contours of how a time-shifted rationality analysis
might proceed and, second, to provide a sufficient sense of plausibility to
warrant further future exploration. The purpose here is not to conclusively
demonstrate a superior analysis of, for example, inter-temporal choice
anomalies, but rather to suggest why it will generally be sensible to con-
sider the TSR hypothesis, and to open the way for an entirely different ap-
proach to solving these puzzles than is currently employed in BLE
135 See, e.g., GOULD & GOULD, supra note 75, at 132-35; L.D. Beletsky & G.H. Orians, Tcrritorial-
ity Among Male Red-Winged Blackbirds, 24 BEHIAV. ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 333 (1989); John R.
Krebs, Territorial Defence in the Great Tit (Pans major): Do Residents Ahays Win?, 11 BEILAV.
ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 185 (1982); Joe Tobias, As-nunctric Territorial Contests in the European
Robin: The Role of Settlement Costs, 54 ANIMAL BEHAV. 9 (1997).
136 Posner apparently anticipated this argument, suggesting: "The only 'rights' in prehistoric soci-
ety would have been possessory rights, and so people w'ho didn't cling to %hat they h2d would have
been at a disadvantage." Posner, supra note 24, at 1565. Ho.evcr, he favors the approach of traditional
rationality, which he subsequently offers. Id. at 1565-67. Paul Rubin raises a similar poaibility in
DARvINIAN POLITICS, supra note 94, suggesting that individuals living at subsistence V ho did nut
overweigh losses would have left fewer offspring than those vho did.
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scholarship.
Presently, remember, we have no models that adequately explain and
connect many instances of seemingly irrational behavior. This is, in part,because researchers have concentrated their efforts on discovering proxi-
mate causes for those behaviors to the exclusion of seeking the complement
necessary for any complete explanation: the ultimate causes for those be-haviors. Ultimate causation is the domain of behavioral biology. Behav-ioral biology is the principle tool of evolutionary analysis, which attempts
to integrate proximate and ultimate explanations (from the social sciences
and life sciences, respectively) into a coherent whole.
In sum, evolutionary analysis, through what we might usefully call
time-shifted rationality, raises the hypothesis, soundly grounded in behav-ioral biology, that at least a significant subset of puzzlingly irrational be-havior is not simply the result of cognitive defects, mechanistic constraint,
or other procedural limitations that suggest we are uninformed, imperfect,
mistaken, malfunctioning, misled, or otherwise uneducated in the wiley
ways of proper decision making. In many cases, such irrational behaviors
are probably the result of substantively rational behavior that simply sur-faces in the wrong era, facing novel environmental conditions that render
once-adaptive behavior maladaptive-and once rational behavior irrational.TSR analysis not only provides plausible explanations for a wide variety of
existing puzzles, briefly surveyed above, but the single principle of TSR
also links them all together, suggesting they are all manifestations of the
same fundamental phenomenon.
TSR analysis, drawing upon existing research in behavioral biology,begins from the proposition that natural selection, a mindless process inca-pable of looking forward, inevitably leaves bodies and brains designed to
overcome challenges posed in past, rather than present or future environ-
ments. TSR analysis then considers whether the environmental features
that make a given irrationality manifest were likely to be encountered in the
EEA-the deep, ancestral, environment of evolutionary adaptation. Theless likely these features were to be encountered, the less likely it is that se-lection pressures unique to them could possibly have preferred brains thatdeal with them well-and therefore the more likely it is that well-honed,
evolved cognitive processes are stumbling over newly changed circum-
stances.
The analysis then considers whether the content of the irrationality,
that is, its substantive, patterned result, was likely to yield behavior that
would have been adaptive, on average, when confronting situations com-
monly encountered during the EEA. The more likely such behavior was
adaptive, the more likely it is, again, that evolved cognitive processes are
now stumbling over novel conditions. Thus, sharp differences between
modem environments and ancestral ones may yield a variety of seeminglyirrational behaviors, including inconsistent preferences, over-
cooperativeness, intertemporal choice anomalies, hyperbolically discounted
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futures, framing effects, a taste for spite, and the endowment effects that re-
sult in the seemingly irrational pricing of property.
In light of TSR, as explored above, it seems probable that we overeat
because our evolved predisposition toward sweets encounters unprecedent-
edly concentrated foodstuffs. We cooperate with strangers, in part, because
we evolved in small groups, with frequent opportunities for future recip-
rocities and powerful reputational effects, now substantially diminished due
to increases in population size and individual mobility. We discount the fu-
ture heavily because in the EEA there rarely was any reliable future. We
think in frequency distributions, rather than statistical probabilities, because
the latter is a recent and less concrete form of information. And we become
attached to what we have because ancestral environments lacked "rights" to
things not actually possessed, and because ancestral subsistence was never
far from the margin.
The benefits of employing TSR are several. In appropriate cases, the
hypothesis that a given irrationality may be the function of time-shifted ra-
tionality, rather than procedurally bounded rationality, helps us understand
why the irrationalities are widespread. It helps us see how a number of
supposed irrationalities can still be reconciled with a rationality framework.
It helps us understand why the content of the irrationalities leads to errors in
one direction rather than another. It shows us how the irrationalities can be
linked together, at the theoretical level, into a coherent whole. It offers a
tool for beginning to predict some of the contexts in which other seeming
irrationalities are likely to emerge, and will help us to expect behavior that
is currently thought to be so surprising.
We might end here. It may be useful to speculate briefly, however,
about other implications of TSR that might be explored, in greater depth, in
the future. The next Part provides some preliminary thinking about one line
of research that may hold promise.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE LAW OF LAW'S LEVERAGE
We can usefully consider law to be a lever for moving human behavior
in directions it would not go on its own.137 Law's fulcrum in this effort is
137 See Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, supra note 7. Like other images
from physics (momentum, inertia, flexibility, slippery slopes, and the like) the lever metaphor has ben
invoked, for many different purposes, in a wide variety of legal contexts. Sometimes, for example, it is
used to emphasize the way a lever multiplies force, effecting large changes with small efforts. Sec. e.g..
E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 2 (1992) (using the concept
of regulatory leverage to describe a ratio of government agency expenditures to consequently-and dis-
proportionately large-redeployed behavior). Sometimes it is used to describe a force applied by threat
of criminal conviction. See eg., Seth F. Kreimer, Releases. Redress. and Police Misconduct: Reflec-
tions on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal Charges, 136
U. PA. L. REv. 851, 929 (1988) ('Both the tradition of legal ethics and the common law definition of
extortion suggest that the use of possible criminal prosecution as leverage to obtain advantage in a civil
lawsuit is inappropriate.'); Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Monrp' Laundering: Problems of Proof and
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the behavioral model it employs. Ideally, the model should integrate the
best information available on why people behave the ways they do. For just
as a lever's efficiency depends on the solidity of its fulcrum, law's effi-
ciency in moving behavior depends on the accuracy of its behavioral model.
As demonstrated earlier, it is often the case that one needs to integrate both
proximate and ultimate causes of behavior to generate a truly robust expla-
nation, on which law's lever may lean.
38
Because the social sciences were artificially divided from the life sci-
ences in some distant past, social sciences traditionally investigate and dis-
cover only proximate causes for behavior. This works serviceably in many
contexts, but is inadequate to the task of meeting some important challenges
of actual human behavior, such as those posed by seemingly irrational be-
havior. Considering irrational phenomena from an ultimate causation or
evolutionary history perspective reveals the probability that much bounded
rationality is really time-shifted rationality, as we have seen.
While this is useful in itself, the implications of TSR extend far beyond
irrationality alone. The TSR approach described above also contributes di-
rectly to improving the model of human behavior on which law relies in
other contexts. As this Part will briefly explore, the power of TSR to un-
cover causes and patterns of previously disconnected behavior may eventu-
ally offer two additional advantages.
First, an evolutionary analysis, deploying the TSR tool, could provide
broad insights into the differing ways law and behavior interact, depending
on the behavior at issue. Because we are alert to the fact that the brain
tends to process information in ways that tended to yield adaptive solutions
to problems encountered in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, we
may expect that behavioral inclinations will generally vary in their suscep-
tibility to the influence of different legal tools. More specifically, evolu-
tionary analysis may offer useful explanations and predictions about the
Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 173, 181 (1996) ("To counter these incentives to
keep quiet, prosecutors often use the leverage of a potential criminal charge."). It is often used to de-
scribe the economic effects of market power. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 515 (1985) (discussing the "ability of firms to use restric-
tive practices to leverage their monopoly power from one market to another"). And it has been used in
the context of civil disputes as well. See, e.g., Ira Mark ElIman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1989) ("The fault rules gave great bargaining leverage to the spouse who felt no urgency to
end the marriage ... ").
My own use of the lever metaphor has been for highlighting the necessary existence of a "fulcrum,"
which I suggest best represents the point of transfer between the energy vested in law and the behavior
we hope to achieve with the tools of law, and also best focuses attention on the utter dependence of law
on solid knowledge about human behavior. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Law, Value-Clarification, and Le-
gal Policy, address at the Human Behavior and Evolution Society Annual Meeting (June 1995); Owen
D. Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES
167, 167 (1997); Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, supra note 7.
138 As a reminder, "proximate cause" and "ultimate cause" are biological terms of art, explained
earlier in subpart II.A.
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comparative difficulties law will encounter, and the comparative regulatory
costs society will therefore pay, in attempting to move particular behaviors
with particular tools (such as prison time). 39 This is because, using evolu-
tionary analysis, we can systematically derive useful predictions about the
relative slopes of demand curves for different behaviors. 40 We have, of
course, empirical information that helps us to describe these, after the fact.
But at present we have very little theoretical foundation that systematically
explains and predicts relative variations in demand curves.14' A collateral
benefit of this approach is that such evolutionary analysis will also suggest
contexts in which some kinds of legal tools may be more effective in mov-
ing behaviors than other kinds.
Second, evolutionary analysis, deploying the TSR tool, can provide a
new lens to view previously hidden features in the architecture of legal sys-
tems. 1 42 In much the same way that the lens of efficiency offered by eco-
nomic analysis helped us see how current law reflects the selective pressure
of efficiencies, the ultimate causation lens that evolutionary analysis pro-
vides can help us see how current law reflects the effects of evolutionary
processes on the human brain. And as twinned lenses enable three-
dimensional sight, greater than the sum of its two parts, so might joining ul-
timate causation and proximate causation enable a broader, richer, more de-
tailed, more accurate, and more penetrating view of law.
These are bold claims, not idly made. Although a full exploration and
defense of them would require separate publication, in what follows I pro-
vide short overviews and examples to explain how this line of reasoning
might proceed, to draw some new connections, and to illustrate the potential
promise of this approach.
139 Professor Wax adverts to a similar point in Amy L. Wax, Against NAature-On Robert Wfight s
The Moral Animal, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 307,330-335 (1996) (book review). Although my emphasis here
is on costs incurred by society in regulating behavior, it is worth noting that regulated individuals may
also incur costs. The Amicus Brief of the Gruter Institute, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
argued, for instance, that "To avoid needless human suffering, rules of law should be framed in harmony
with the rules that nature has built into the biology of our species, except where some clear ground of
public policy dictates otherwise." I am grateful to Donald Elliott for pointing out this passage.
140 I will adopt the common but imprecise convention of using variations in slope to capture the
idea of variations in elasticity by, for example, describing inelastic demand oith a steeply sloped de-
mand curve. Technically, the elasticity of a demand curve, and the curve's slope, are not the same.
Slope depends on the rate of change in price and quantity, while elasticity depends on percentage
changes. On every straight-line demand curve, elasticity varies from infinity, at the vertical axis inter-
cept when quantity demanded is zero, to zero, at the horizontal axis w'hen price per unit is zero. The
curve below the midpoint (at which elasticity is precisely one) is therefore inelastic while the curve
above the midpoint is elastic. However, it is common to refer to flatter or steeper slopes as reflecting
elasticity or inelasticity, respectively, because in the former case we tend to focus on the upper half of
the curve, and in the latter case on the lower half.
141 This may be one reason why some economists are so fond of the convenient assertion that "there
is no accounting for tastes."
142 Note that a number of the sources cited supra note 7 have also attempted to explore the effects
of human behavioral biology on modem legal features.
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This Part consists of two subparts, which track the two advantages de-
scribed above: 1) estimating relative costs for moving different behaviors;
and 2) revealing underlying legal structures. The subsequent (and final)
Part of the Article anticipates and evaluates objections.
A. Comparative Responsiveness to Sanctions
Traditional economic analysis predicts that if we increase the cost of a
good, the demand for that good will generally decrease-along a curve that
describes how much people want the good at any given price (given avail-
able resources 'and substitute goods). Because this principle operates for
behaviors, as well as for goods, we often consider legal sanctions as prices,
when attempting to calculate the effect on behavior that an increase in the
legal sanction (a fine or a jail term, for example) will yield.
Because sanctions are often costly in themselves, it would be useful to
have some sense, ahead of time, of the probable return on investment in
sanctions. Nonetheless, we lack theoretical models to predict systemati-
cally whether the retreat along the demand curve, as penalties rise, will be
fast or slow, reflecting price sensitivity or insensitivity. 143 The principle in-
troduced in the next section, though it cannot predict such curves with pre-
cision, may eventually afford us some intellectual traction on the effort and
at least allow predictions about the comparative slopes of demand curves
for law-relevant behaviors. It may thus afford some basis for estimating
relative costs, to society, of attempting to move different kinds of behavior.
1. The Law ofLaw's Leverage.--Combining the principles of behav-
ioral biology summarized in Part II, with the principle of time-shifted ra-
tionality, articulated in Part III, would appear logically to yield a broad and
useful description of the relationship between law and behavior. We might
refer to this as the law of law's leverage, which I suggest may be formu-
lated as follows:
The magnitude of legal intervention necessary to reduce or to increase the in-
cidence of any human behavior will correlate positively or negatively, respec-
tively, with the extent to which a predisposition contributing to that behavior
was adaptive for its bearers, on average, in past environments.
That is, the law of law's leverage describes the phenomenon in which
the aggregate difficulty of using law to reduce the incidence of any behavior
143 Indeed, it is likely the case that some of the behaviors we label as irrational seem irrational only
because the demand for them seems so much more inelastic (with the relevant part of the demand curve
steeper) than traditional economic or social science thinking can systematically explain. A largo in-
crease in legally imposed sanctions for behavior results in disproportionately small reductions in the in-
cidence of the behavior at issue. For example, studies indicate that the most common variety of
homicides results from seemingly trivial altercations, the swift and violent resolution of which cannot
plausibly be thought to stack up against the penalty (even discounted by the probability of apprehension
and conviction). See generally MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 125 (1988).
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depends on the extent to which that behavior, or the psychological mecha-
nism influencing it, was adaptive for its bearers, on average, in the relevant
environment of evolutionary adaptation. Resistance to change will vary in
patterns reflecting evolutionary influences on behavior. Similarly, the ag-
gregate difficulty of using law to increase the incidence of any behavior vill
decrease with the extent to which that behavior, or the psychological
mechanism influencing it, was adaptive for its bearers, on average, in the
relevant environment of evolutionary adaptation. Several aspects of this
formulation require separate explanation.
The law of law's leverage predicts that less legal intervention will be
necessary to shift a behavior in ways that tended to increase reproductive
success in ancestral environments than will be necessary to shift behavior in
ways that tended to decrease reproductive success in ancestral environ-
ments. Put another way, the slope of the demand curve for historically
adaptive behavior that is now deemed to be socially (in some cases even in-
dividually) undesirable will be far steeper than the slope of the demand
curve for behavior that was comparatively less adaptive in ancestral envi-
ronments.14 Importantly, this relationship between the slopes will hold,
even when the costs that an individual actually and foreseeably incurs in
behaving in an historically adaptive way will exceed presently foreseeable
benefits of such behavior.
By use of the language "magnitude of legal intervention" I refer in
most instances to costliness. Greater resistance to change will increase the
cost of effecting change. However, it is important to note, as a caveat, that
assessing the magnitude of legal intervention may in some cases require
separate attention to the severity of an intervention (e.g., the harshness of a
penalty). This is because, although in the typical case increased severity
will simply yield increased costs, there may be unusual cases in which se-
vere interventions are less administratively cumbersome, and therefore less
costly, than are less severe interventions, which may at times be preferred
because other values are in some tension with the value of changing the be-
havior at issue.
By use of the language "the extent to which" a predisposition contrib-
uting to the behavior was adaptive to its bearers, I mean to underscore the
fact that while members of a species share a variety of different adapta-
tions, some are comparatively more essential than others. In a primate spe-
cies, for example, hunger is-more essential to survival than a capacity for
empathy. And the abilities to distinguish kin from non-kin, and male from
female, are more essential than are many other psychological adaptations.
Admittedly, not all comparisons are easily made. The utility of some adap-
tations depends on the existence of others, and both physical and behavioral
adaptations are necessarily intertvined (as in the context of sexual coupling,
for example). But there is value in even the rough sorting of adaptations
144 See supra note 140.
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along a continuum of importance, for even the rough theoretical structure
this affords is better than none.
By use of the language "a predisposition" I refer to a psychological
trait that is a heritable and behavior-biasing algorithm manifested in the
brain's neural architecture.
For a behavioral predisposition to be "adaptive," it must have con-
ferred greater fitness benefits on individuals that bore it than did any other
contemporaneously existing alternatives exhibited by other individuals
within the population-and thus have been maintained by natural selec-
tion.145 As always, genetic fitness is measured in terms of inclusive fitness
(rather than in offspring only, for example). Thus, an individual's overall
fitness calculation takes into account the extent to which an individual has
increased the reproductive success of its relatives, discounted by their de-
grees of consanguinity.
1 46
The use of the language "on average" in the law of law's leverage re-
fers to whether the cumulated effects of the adaptation, across all the organ-
isms that bore it, yielded increases in inclusive fitness that outweighed any
decreases. That is, "on average" the trait increased the reproductive success
of organisms that bore it. Thus, the occurrence of maladaptive outcomes
for some individuals, even in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, is
not dispositive of the adaptation analysis, since it is only the average effect
that matters.147 "On average" does not refer to the average fitness conse-
quences within a single individual, throughout its lifetime. Nor does it refer
to any net of fitness effects of all behavioral traits an organism simultane-
ously manifests.
"Past environments" refers to the environment of evolutionary adapta-
tion (EEA). The relevant environment of evolutionary adaptation varies
from feature to feature.' 48 For example, the EEA from which the opposable
thumb emerged doubtless antedated the EEA in which language acquisition
predispositions emerged. And there is some debate over how to best de-
scribe the EEA for various adaptations. Nonetheless, there are a number of
things we can know with confidence about features that our ancestors' envi-
145 See ALCOCK, supra note 75, at G-I (defining "Adaptation").
146 On reproductive success and inclusive fitness, see supra note 83.
147 See ALCOCK, supra note 75, at G-1 (defining "Adaptation"); FUTUYMA, supra note 75, at 149-
83. Robert Wright illustrates this with the image of a ground squirrel sentry.
If the warning call saves the lives of four full siblings that would otherwise die, two of which carry
the gene responsible for it, then the gene has done well for itself, even if the sentry containing it
pays the ultimate sacrifice. This superficially selfless gene will do much better over the ages than
a superficially selfish gene that induced its carrier to scurry to safety while four siblings--and two
copies of the gene, on average-perished.
WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 158.
148 Useful discussion of the variety of views on this point appears in Martin Daly & Margo I. Wil-
son, Human Evolutionary Psychology and Animal Behaviour, 57 ANIMAL BEHAV. 509, 512-14 (1998);
Robert Foley, The Adaptive Legacy of Human Evolution: A Searchfor the Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptedness, 4 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 194 (1995-1996).
1192
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1192 2000-2001
Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Laws Leverage
ronments did and did not contain. (For example, they contained internal
fertilization, giving rise to sex asymmetries in minimum parental invest-
ment and maximum number of offspring; they did not contain automobiles).
And it is to these features that analysis must refer.
The full-fledged phrasing, to put it more accurately, if much more
cumbersomely, is this: the law of law's leverage states that the magnitude
of legal intervention necessary to reduce or to increase the incidence of any
human behavior will correlate positively or negatively, respectively, with
the extent to which a behavior-biasing, information-processing predisposi-
tion underlying that behavior (a) increased the inclusive fitness of those
bearing the predisposition, on average, more than it decreased it, across all
those bearing the predisposition, in the environment in which it evolved and
(b) increased the inclusive fitness of those bearing the predisposition more,
on average, than did any other alternative predisposition that happened to
appear in the environment during the same period.
This law of law's leverage I have proposed offers one possible expla-
nation for why some of what we refer to as non-market behavior is non-
market behavior. Non-market behavior is essentially behavior that is rela-
tively insensitive to price changes. What I am arguing is that non-market
behavior is precisely that behavior that will be predicted to be compara-
tively insensitive to prices as a result of the law of law's leverage. That is,
non-market behavior arises because of the effects of evolutionary processes
on our brain's information-processing patterns. Ironically, it is precisely
the economizing force of natural selection that gave rise to the behavioral
predispositions we now deem to be beyond simple economic analysis, be-
cause the origins and strengths of preferences seemed so mysterious.
Because of the way natural selection builds brains, legal contexts in
which the law of law's leverage may be particularly relevant include those
aspects of, for example, constitutional law, criminal law, family law, torts,




child-rearing; crimes of passion;
status-seeking; moralistic aggression;
property and territory; risk-valuation and risk-taking;
resource accumulation; cooperativelaltruistic behavior,
sexuality (including infidelity and male mate-guarding and related
jealousy); violence.
Behavioral biology suggests there are evolutionary underpinnings to
the essential elements of each of these activities. This list of contexts in
which the law of law's leverage predicts costly challenges for law circum-
scribes a great deal of human behavior. By doing so, it begins to highlight
the essential connection between behavior, on one hand, and emotions,
tastes, norms, and preferences, on the other. That connection is not as in-
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scrutable to the methods of scientists and legal thinkers as often supposed,
because the content of emotions, norms, and the like will tend, like every
other domain of human behavior, to reflect the evolutionary forces that have
inclined human brains to the form and function they now exhibit. 149
2. Examples.-While explanation is not justification, explanation
surely provides information useful to any efforts to change human behavior
through the mechanisms of law. Here are several examples of contexts in
which the combination of existing biobehavioral research and the law of
law's leverage may operate to make sense of behaviors that historically
have been comparatively insensitive to legal interventions.
The cornerstone of an economic approach to crime is that increasing
the price of engaging in an illegal activity will tend to decrease the inci-
dence of that activity. While this may be true as a general matter, we know
there are many contexts in which illegal behavior is likely to be relatively
insensitive to the magnitude of legal sanctions, in ways that traditional eco-
nomic theory cannot predict. Examples include what we have come (as a
function of tautology, rather than theory) to call crimes of "passion," such
as killing the lover of a spouse caught in flagrante delicto, or killing a
daughter's rapist.15
0
It is intuitively obvious to us that laws prohibiting such behavior are
unlikely to be effective deterrents. This is a remarkable admission. The
question is: why? Why is this intuitively obvious, and by what theoretical
mechanisms could we predict the pattern in which behaviors will be less
sensitive to cost? Evolutionary analysis provides an important window into
the kinds of contexts in which increasing criminal penalties is simply un-
likely to materially affect behavior. It may eventually help to delineate
more clearly and to explain more satisfactorily the boundaries beyond
which the rational actor model ceases to operate in the usual straightforward
way.
A short survey of several examples illustrates the potential of this ap-
proach. Evolutionary analysis predicts that, and explains why, the slope of
the demand curve for adulterous behavior is likely to be comparatively
149 Among sources to consider the relationship between biology, morality, and norms are the fol-
lowing: ALEXANDER, supra note 127; RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
(1979); ARNHART, supra note 127; DE WAAL, supra note 127; DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S
DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE (1995); INVESTIGATING BIOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 127; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999); RIDLEY, supra note 127; SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra note 127; WILSON, supra note 127,
WRIGHT, supra note 75; Jones, supra note 8; Krebs, supra note 127.
150 For analysis of how evolutionary processes affect attitudes toward rape, see Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7. Incidentally, I do not mean to suggest that there is a predisposi-
tion toward killing in such contexts, rather than aggressing generally. It is possible that such predisposi-
tions exist. See David M. Buss & T. K. Shackelford, Human Aggression in Evolutionary Psychological
Perspective, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 605 (1997). But even a predisposition to aggress that only some-
times leads to killing as a by-product is sufficient to have the implications mentioned here.
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steep15 1 (as is the slope for most sexual behavior) and thus comparatively
insensitive to the imposition of legal prohibitions (or other costs, such as ef-
fect on career). Evolutionary analysis also predicts that and may help ex-
plain why, marriage, separation, divorce, and remarriage behavior will be
less sensitive to legal changes than will be many other forms of behavior.152
Because, as we know, natural selection disfavors inbreeding among close
relatives, evolutionary analysis also and separately predicts that it will be
far less costly to discourage incest among parents and their natural children,
and between siblings reared together, than among stepparents and stepchil-
dren, and among stepchildren. r53 Because we know that natural selection
favors discriminative parental solicitude rather than indiscriminate parental
solicitude (that is, it generally favors psychological mechanisms that bias
resources toward offspring over non-offspring), we can explain and antici-
pate that the cost of reducing child abuse will be greater, per capita, for
stepparent households than for non-stepparent households.' 54 Similarly, we
can predict that men under court-order to provide child support payments
for a child they know or suspect they did not father will be less likely to
comply than will biological fathers.
One of the principal implications of natural and sexual selection is that
the sexes will be somewhat differently inclined in domains related to mat-
ing. And both the theoretical and empirical foundations for expecting
males to be more sexually jealous than females (only on average, of course)
are very well established.' 6 (The asymmetries for males and females of in-
151 See generally BUSS, supra note 75.
152 See generally HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MONOGAMY,
ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE (1992). For a recent study on the relative insensitivity ofdivorce rates to di-
vorce laws, see Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Betecen Divorce Lams
and Divorce Rates, 18 IlNr'L REV. L. & ECON. 341 (1998).
153 Some studies suggest that a girl is much more likely to be incestuously abused by a stepfather
than by a biological father. See, eg., Diana E. H. Russell, The Prevalence and Seriousness ofincestu-
ous Abuse: Stepfathers vs. Biological Fathers, 8 CHILD ABUSE & NEGL iCT 15 (1984) (noting that it is
eight times more likely). Moreover, the severity of incestuous abuse appears to be greater ith stepfa-
thers. Id. Existing data are mixed, however, with some studies suggesting little distinction. Scogener-
ally JuDITH LEWIS HERmAN & LISA HIRSCHMAN, FATHER-DAUGHER INCEST (1981). On the human
tendency to avoid brother-sister incest where siblings are reared together, see GOLDSMITH. supra note
75, at 9-10.
154 The risk of an infant being killed by a parent is more than 100 times grcater if there is a step-
parent in the house than if there is not. See, eg., DALY & WILSON, supra note 143, at 89; Jones, Evolu.
tionary Analysis in Law, supra note 7, at 1207.
155 See Margo Wilson, Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U. To.1ONro
FACULTY L. REV. 217, 223 (1987) (citing S.H. Fritschner, The Nature of Paternity Actions. 19 J.
FAMILY L. 475,492 (1980-81)). 1 am grateful to David Buss for first alerting me to this po.ibility. For
an account of a man paying child support for 3 children that DNA analysis proved not to be his, see
Tamar Lewin, In Genetic Testing for Paternity. Law Often Lags Behind Science, NEW YORK TIMES,
March 11, 2001, at Al.
156 See, eg., DAVID M. BUSS, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSY IS AS NECESSARY AS
LOVE AND SEx (2000); FISHER, supra note 152; David M. Buss et al., Sex Differences in Jcalousy Eva-
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temally fertilizing species in the consequences of a partner having extra-
pair copulation favored sexual territorialness in males even more strongly
than it did in females, since only males can be uncertain of their genetic re-
lationship to their putative children.) Evolutionary analysis therefore pre-
dicts that the slope of the demand curve for jealous violence (against rivals,
and potentially straying partners) is likely to be steeper, on average, for
males than for females.
One of the most significant findings of modem criminology is that
most homicides arise from seemingly trivial altercations. One boy gives the
finger to another boy, in public. The latter shoots him. We can be reasona-
bly confident, of course, that the shooter is generally motivated more by
emotion than by deliberate calculus. But evolutionary analysis offers a ro-
bust theory for why males, in particular (and young males, more specifi-
cally) are so emotionally aroused by perceived threats to status, one of the
most valuable of resources. 157 It suggests that threats to status are of great-
est cost when there are observers whose opinions are valued (as if as assets)
by the threatened individual. It therefore predicts that the slope of the de-
mand curve for violence consequent to status threats will be steeper than
that for most other proscribable behavior, and will be particularly steep in
public fora.
And, beyond aiding us in evaluating the inertia law must overcome,
when attempting to shift different behaviors, evolutionary analysis may
provide a useful window into the relative effectiveness of different legal
techniques used to shift behavior. For example, scholars and judges have
recently rejuvenated punishments that impose reputational costs rather than
monetary costs. 58  The idea is that locally publicizing the name of tax
cheats, for example, may be a more effective deterrent than stiff but private
monetary penalties. Those not informed of evolutionary theory may under-
estimate the value people place on local status, value that is readily suscep-
tible to evolutionary analysis.
B. The Architecture of Law
As we look across our culture and others, at the various architectures of
law, we see a variety of patterns. Certainly, there are many differences in
the details. But that cannot obscure the fact that the main themes are gener-
ally the same.' 59 Great bodies of law address the disposition, control, use,
lution, Physiology, and Psychology, 3 PSYCHOL. Scl. 251 (1992); Martin Daly et al., Male Sexual Jeal-
ousy, 3 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 11 (1982).
157 See, e.g., DALY & WILSON, supra note 143; David M. Buss & T.K. Shackelford, Human Ag-
gression in Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 605 (1997); Daly & Wil-
son, supra note 148.
158 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Ctii. L. REV. 733
(1998); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055
(1998).
159 See, e.g., DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991).
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and exchange of resources, separate permissible from impermissible sexual
behavior, define privileges and obligations of child rearing, and the like.
We see allowances made for the sometimes-undesirable behaviors of "rea-
sonable" people. We see forced sexual intercourse as a uniquely uncon-
scionable affront to body and psychology. We see armed conflicts over
territory and attempted constraints on the exercise of aggression. And, even
in our own federal Constitution, we see basic assumptions about human na-
ture: ambition exists, and unrestrained it yields disproportionate concentra-
tions of power and resources. 160
To our perennial question "Why is the law the way it is?" have been
offered a variety of answers, having recourse to, for example, God, the poli-
tics of power, and the principles of efficiency. To these and like others,
evolutionary analysis may eventually submit another.
Viewed from the perspective of the law of law's leverage, the configu-
ration of all legal systems will tend to reflect their encounters with human
brains shaped by natural selection. The law of law's leverage can therefore
reveal previously underappreciated forces at work in shaping law, the evi-
dence of which is manifest in legal and social institutions. And it will be as
evident in what we attempt to regulate by legal means as it is in what we do
not.
Take, for example, a hypothetical legal rule that required an adult, in a
crisis situation involving both her children and the children of others, to
save children in order of their ranked intelligence (or any other desirable
characteristic), irrespective of her own relatedness to each. We know that
such a legal rule would be absurd. But why? It is not because the rule
would lead to inefficient outcomes. To the contrary, the outcome might in-
crease social wealth compared to the alternative.
It is not enough to say that powerful social norms would generate irre-
sistible emotions in the woman to save her own children, because it so hap-
pens that we would expect the same behavior from parents all over the
world, regardless of the many vicissitudes of culture. We know the rule
would be absurd because we intuitively sense that the preference to save
one's own child would be insensitive to variations in legal costs we might
impose in an effort to shift the behavior-all over the planet, in every hu-
man culture. The theoretical basis for that sense of relative inelasticity of
the demand for certain behaviors, in certain contexts, is not simply accul-
turation alone, but the law of law's leverage, as derived from the effects of
evolution on human behavior-biasing psychological predispositions.
This may help to explain a variety of common features in the architec-
ture of law. For example, why do people find the right to marry to be so
160 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive Laiv A Prolegomcnon, 8
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 229-239 (1997); John McGinnis, The Primacy of Naturo: A Prak-
gomenon to Evolutionary Political Science, HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY STUDIES IN HUNAIN
NATURE, Occasional Paper No. 2 (2000).
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important? Why is adultery almost never prosecuted? Why does reproduc-
tive decision-making pose such contentious issues? Why is rape so
uniquely offensive, compared to other physical assaults? Why is it not pos-
sible to write a prenuptial marriage contract that legally binds a new couple
to a detailed program of behavior through the course of their marriage? 161
What provides the theoretical basis for employing a reasonable person stan-
dard? Why are crimes of passion routinely afforded less punishment than
other crimes, and how have we decided what they are?
It is commonly noted that economics "laid bare the architecture of the
common law by showing how much of it could be derived from the axioms
of economics.' ' 162 Much of it can be. But an evolutionary analysis may
eventually supply an even broader perspective on the legal institutions of
the human animal. 163 That perspective is not only often consistent with the
axioms of economics, it also demonstrates that much of those areas that
economic theory has not successfully penetrated can be understood to be a
product of the relentlessly economic influences of natural selection.
The law of law's leverage, for example, can be described as an in-
tensely powerful winnowing force that explains a great deal of the laws we
have, as well as the laws we don't have. One of the limits on law-making
has been not only the fact that inefficient legal rules tend to disappear faster
than efficient ones, but also that legal rules that would be extremely diffi-
cult to enforce tend not to be enacted, even if they would otherwise lead to
highly desirable outcomes. In this way, light from the law of law's leverage
tends to silhouette the small proportion of all possible legal rules that are
not far too costly, because of evolved human psychology, to even consider.
C. Summary
None of the examples speculatively ventured in Subparts A and B of
this Part was intended to provide irrefutable proof that either the varying re-
sponsiveness of human behavior to changes in incentives or the underlying
features of legal systems can only be explained as neurological artifacts of
our evolved brain. Rather (and as in the case of TSR, earlier), the examples
are intended to first suggest the general contours of how analysis using the
law of law's leverage might proceed, and to subsequently provide a suffi-
cient sense of plausibility to warrant further exploration. The purpose of
this Part is not to conclusively demonstrate a superior analysis of, for ex-
ample, why sexual behavior is less pliable to legal tools than is jaywalking
behavior, but rather to open the way for an entirely different approach to
161 Theodore C. Bergstrom poses this question in Economics in a Family Way, 34 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1903, 1929-30 (1996).
162 Baird, supra note 15, at 1132. For overviews, see, for example, BARNES & STOUT, supra note
125; POSNER, supra note 10.
163 1 further explore this possibility in Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History, supra
note 7.
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solving the mysteries of patterned variation in human responsiveness to
changes in legal incentives.
Presently, remember, we have no satisfactory models to explain and
connect existing data on differing slopes of demand curves for different
law-relevant behavior. This is probably because we have neglected the
problem, dismissing variation as borne of causes that are either categori-
cally inscrutable or randomly generated by the deus ax machina of culture.
Evolutionary analysis of behavior, focusing on brain design and func-
tion, is today providing a far richer understanding of these behaviors than
has been previously obtained. Integrating this perspective with law can
provide a systematic way of organizing, explaining, and predicting the con-
texts in which demand for behavior will be least sensitive to prices imposed
by law. This, in turn, is important for the legal system, because it enables a
systematic comparative assessment of the costs to society of attempting to
change these behaviors, and variations in these costs may help to explain
why some of the main features of law are as they are.
V. OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
This Part considers several likely objections to employing time-shifted
rationality and the law of law's leverage in legal 
analysis.
A. Ad Hocery
Critics sometimes fault evolutionists for seeking to explain everything
in evolutionary terms, on the premise that a principle explaining everything
explains nothing. That criticism might extend with equal force to time-
shifted rationality as a partial explanation for some seemingly irrational be-
havior.165 This general criticism of evolutionary reasoning has intuitive ap-
peal and in some instances has undoubtedly helped chasten theorists against
too-facile hypotheses, which sometimes seem to be ad hoc. The challenge,
of course, is to distinguish between more and less legitimate hypotheses.
And in our efforts to do so, three things bear noting.
First, it is quite clear that an effort to reconcile every observable behav-
ior with evolutionary history is insufficient, by itself, to render all resultant
explanations ad hoc. By comparison, we observe that rocks fall, birds fly,
and hot air balloons rise. But we would never fault a physicist for claiming
that each of these phenomena-no matter how disparate--must either rec-
164 1 consider several additional objections to evolutionary analysis in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L REv. (forthcoming 2001). As this is no
venue for a broad rebuttal to criticisms of evolutionary theory generally, readers interested in challeng-
ing the value or robustness of evolutionary theory may find numerous other places in w.-hich such rebut-
tals are undertaken. See, eg., DOUGLAS J. FUTUYA, SCIENCE ON TFUAL THE CASE FOR EvoLU'tON
(1983). A number of the sources cited supra note 75 are also useful.
165 Coincidentally, it might also be extended to commonly encountered assertions that all humnan
behavior can be explained by socialization or culture and similar environmental determinism.
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oncile with the theory of gravity or overthrow it. We make this strong
claim because the theory of gravity, while not perfect, is backed by such
overwhelming evidence that we consider it very robust. The first time we
see a balloon rise as a rock falls we may be puzzled, but we would neither
abandon the theory of gravity nor denounce its practitioners for attempting
to sweep too much under its auspices. Attraction of object to object by
gravitational forces is foundational, and while it may take time to puzzle out
how things may rise or fall, we are confident that the mechanisms by which
they do so reflect the relentless effects of gravity.
Similarly, it is not only acceptable but presently required as a matter of
modem science and logic that we start from the presumption that all human
behavior, whether rational or irrational, cooperative or competitive, must in
the end reconcile with known evolutionary processes-or overthrow them.
While there are still debates about details of evolution on the margin (just as
there continue to be debates among those studying gravity), the process of
evolution by natural selection is no less robust than the gravitational attrac-
tion of mass to mass. We may not know by what precise pathways evolu-
tionary processes (such as natural and sexual selection) leave a big-brained
species capable of widespread, species-typical errors in judgment. But that
they have remains undisputed. We may not yet discern the cognitive proc-
esses by which we reach specific decisions, develop our various prefer-
ences, or give content to emotional realities. But that the cognitive
processes must inevitably reflect both the guiding and scarring of evolu-
tionary processes has not been significantly challenged by any comprehen-
sive, alternative, nonsupernatural theory.
Second, it would be error to conclude that, simply because every be-
havior must square with evolutionary history or overthrow it, each causal
hypothesis is as easy as another, affording no basis for preference or rejec-
tion. One occasionally hears the view that evolutionary theories may be
disregarded, because their explanations necessarily cut equally in opposite
directions. This criticism seems to be based on the mistaken belief that one
can often, perhaps always, construct two equally plausible evolutionary ac-
counts that could explain both what is observed and the opposite of what is
observed.
66
For example, a critic might think that evolutionary processes are just as
likely to have favored perfect rationality as irrationality, and conclude on
that basis that evolutionary theorizing can offer nothing reliable at present
to the study of irrationality. After all, would it not be adaptive to be able to
reason without logical flaws? But such thinking would reflect a serious
misapprehension of the very basics of evolutionary processes. Specifically,
the fact that natural selection would have favored a trait, if it arose, says
precisely nothing about the likelihood that the trait exists. Evolution is
path-dependent (you must always get here from there), with natural selec-
166 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 65, at 1600.
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tion inexorably sifting among contemporaneously existing heritable traits
(varying by genetic mutation). Such sifting favors reproductively useful
traits, but it does not create them. For, as zoologist Richard Dawkins once
put it, no one would expect pigs to have wings, even if they would come in
handy from time to time. And, similarly, natural selection cannot build an
all-purpose optimizing machine, even if it would be beneficial to have
one.
16 7 -
Natural selection cannot look forward. Problems do not generate
mutational solutions. And natural selection never guarantees perfection.
Whatever heritable abilities exist exist only because they were left over af-
ter alternative traits, somewhat less likely to contribute to reproductive suc-
cess, were gradually swept away in the relentless process that affords
compounded gains over time to even small reproductive advantages. We
have absolutely no reason to believe that evolutionary processes have af-
forded us an optimal brain, or one capable of choosing and inclined to
choose the most appropriate behavior for achieving any end-even repro-
ductive success. It just doesn't work that way. Consequently, evolutionary
hypotheses are always seriously constrained by the empirical facts of our
own evolutionary history, by the limits of what evolution can achieve, and
the significantly channeled processes by which it achieves anything.
B. Parsimony
A thoughtful critic of the evolutionary analysis that undergirds time-
shifted rationality and the law of law's leverage may object that it is unpar-
simonious, and therefore to be disfavored. Existing economic or behavioral
economic approaches (this logic might go) are simple, and they ignore be-
havioral biology wholesale. The approach I recommend would seem to re-
quire additional, seemingly over-complicating assumptions about the
influence of evolutionary processes on behavior.
Parsimony is a useful and principled reason to prefer one theory-a
simpler one-to another one that is more complex, requiring more assump-
tions. We should, as a general rule, prefer more parsimonious explanations
to less parsimonious ones, at least as a starting point. It is an underappreci-
ated fact, however, that simplicity has never been the sole prerequisite of
parsimony. The principle of parsimony requires a rebuttably presumptive
preference for the simplest theory that is consistent with known (or at least
accepted) facts. Such facts include the evolution of the human brain by
natural selection. And thus no theory that posits the existence of a brain
natural selection could not have designed can be more parsimonious than
one grounded in knowledge of evolutionary processes. To think otherwise
is to think that it would be more parsimonious to construct a twenty story
building beginning with the nineteenth floor than to begin at the ground
167 See generally supra note 84.
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level.
Science knows of no process by which the human brain could not be
materially influenced by its own evolutionary history. We know of no pro-
cess by which our emotions, norms, tastes, preferences, and behaviors could
be categorically unaffected (or only trivially affected) by the process that
built the brain in the first place. Consequently, until the theory of evolution
by natural selection is displaced by some other non-supernatural theory, a
theory of cognition must be consistent with evolutionary history to qualify
as parsimonious. In some cases, this makes evolutionary explanations more
parsimonious than alternative ones.
C. Adaptationism
Biologists prefer not to assume, unreflectively, that every feature of
every organism is an adaptation. 68 Many features are by-products, some-
times even disadvantageous ones, of other, compensatingly advantageous
features. Does the approach advanced here make the mistake of assuming
adaptation too quickly? It does not.
My argument is not that we should assume that all human irrationality
is really time-shifted rationality. Rather, we should immediately cease our
practice of assuming that none of it is. Once open to the hypothesis that a
supposed irrationality may be the product of a temporal mismatch between
adaptation and modem environment, we favor or disfavor the hypothesis by
first triangulating from what else we think we know-about brain design,
evolutionary processes, the archaeological record, ancestral species, the en-
vironmental features they likely encountered, the behavior of modem hu-
mans, the behavior of other species, results of experimentation with other
species, and the like-and then assessing plausibility. What we look for
here, as in all other scientific endeavors, is a sense of "fit" with the many
implications and historical antecedents of facts in which we have confi-
dence, behavioral observations, commonalities with other species, and
overall theoretical coherence.' 69 While we should not be quick to assume
adaptation, nor should we be quick to assume brain defect or limitation.
Our misdiagnosis may drive incorrect conclusions, and inefficient laws.
D. Mechanisms
It is considered highly unlikely that any cognitive process or behavior
is mediated by a single gene. And yet the notion that biology influences
behavior depends on gene-environment interactions. The complexity of
these interactions leaves them as yet unknown, and perhaps never truly
knowable. A thoughtful critic of the evolutionary analysis advanced here
might argue that until we can identify the precise mechanisms by which
168 For useful discussion, see ALCOCK, supra note 75, at 266-68; WILLIAMS, supra note 82.
169 1 discussed this process in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 7.
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specific neural pathways are constructed, we should hesitate.
Were we to aspire (unwisely) to engineer an endowment-effect-free
brain (for instance), surely we would need to know more about mechanisms
and pathways. But at the level at which law operates-regulating behavior
on the basis of behavioral models-specification of mechanisms and path-
ways is wholly unnecessary. What matters is that we understand major
forces at work in brain design. Just as it would be possible to know impor-
tant things about any operational sailboat, small or large, as a function of
inescapable physical features and forces of water, gravity, and wind, with-
out recourse to the boat's blueprints, it is possible to know important things
about the design and function of brains, human or non-human, as a function
of inescapable physical and evolutionary forces, without recourse to neuro-
anatomy or microbiology.
E. Quantification
While the law of law's leverage has clear utility at the gross-cut level,
its utility is clearly imprecise. How troublesome should this be? For ex-
ample, the metric of the law of law's leverage is not clear, and it does not
quantify in detail. It does not predict the exact steepness of any demand
curve's slope. Nor does it predict the precise shape of the curve itself.
Moreover, it will be difficult to measure or describe the requisite reproduc-
tive nexus in the EEA with precision.
Though these features may somewhat limit the power of the law of
law's leverage as a tool, they do not negate it. The concept of bounded ra-
tionality, by comparison, is no more precise (arguably less so), and is far
less explanatory and predictive. It is nonetheless widely, and often use-
fully, employed. Also by comparison, it is often difficult to specify with
precision the line between the presence and absence of consideration in
contract. And yet even that imprecise concept has found acceptance and
widespread utility in law. The value of the evolutionary tools developed
here does not depend on whether they can quantify. The value depends on
whether they can improve our explanatory and predictive power beyond
that of models we currently employ.
F. Hubris
Finally, is it not simply hubris to articulate principles purporting to de-
scribe mindless influences on the human mind? I don't think so. As an ini-
tial matter, these principles are not dramatic, speculative jumps from what
is now known. They represent conclusions derivable from a series of small
steps, each grounded in the empirically reliable evidence and sound theory
underlying modem behavioral biology. In a very important sense, it would
probably be more hubristic to think that humans, alone among all living or-
ganisms, have categorically escaped the reach of the evolutionary process
that built our brains, and that therefore, in conducting our important job of
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regulating human behavior, we may ignore behavioral biology without con-
sequence.
CONCLUSION
Law deals in human behavior. The power of its models limits the
power of law. The rational actor model often works. But it also tends to
fail us in the face of real people-with their puzzlingly patterned assort-
ments of emotions, foibles, and fears.
It is increasingly clear that law must respond. It is less clear how. Be-
havioral law and economics scholars, ably integrating cognitive psychology
insights, have established an empirical basis for modifying our behavioral
models and for beginning to explore the implications for law. But theoreti-
cal structure necessary for greater explanatory and predictive power is miss-
ing.
What I have argued is as follows. First, as we attempt to develop a
theoretical foundation that can adequately encompass both rational and irra-
tional behavior, we can usefully partner both economics and behavioral
economics with behavioral biology. Although behavioral biology provides
no normative guidance as to what our specific goals should be, it does pro-
vide important methodological tools, robust theories, and mountains of
data, all useful in gaining deeper insights into the evolutionary forces that
shape and influence all behavior-human and non-human.
Second, the evolutionary analysis that such a partnership furthers
strongly suggests that a substantial and important subset of the irrationali-
ties we have long ascribed to cognitive defect should be ascribed, instead,
to cognitive design. Those irrationalities are likely to be products of what I
have here referred to as time-shifted rationality--the temporal mismatch be-
tween the environment in which natural selection shaped the brain to func-
tion and different, modem environments that technology has only recently
enabled. Such a view makes coherent sense of the nonrandom content of
some seemingly irrational behavior, reveals previously hidden connections
among a wide variety of seemingly separate irrationalities, and affords far
greater predictive power to our efforts both to anticipate the circumstances
in which seemingly irrational behavior will appear and to explain and pre-
dict the content and directionality of the seemingly irrational results. Fur-
ther, by adding a deeper temporal dimension, encompassing evolutionary
time, the analysis often reconciles those results with traditional measures of
rationality, rendering time-shifted rationalities a new and important subset
of substantive rationality. While it would undoubtedly be a mistake to con-
clude that all seeming irrationalities were once adaptive, it is surely no less
a mistake to assume that none of them were. There can be no serious as-
sault on the paradoxes of human behavior without the tools of behavioral
biology.
Third, time-shifted rationality logically implies a principle, which I
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have termed the law of law's leverage, that may be useful in two ways. It
can help us to better explain and predict the comparative difficulties law
may encounter in attempting to shift different behaviors, by affording us a
framework for estimating the relative steepness of demand curves for vari-
ous behaviors regulated by law. And it affords an entirely new, modem,
and biologically informed perspective on the underlying architecture of law,
helping to explain why some of the larger features have developed as they
have, and helping to differentiate between more probable and less probable
features of future legal systems.
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